

**BEFORE THE UTTARAKHAND PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL
AT DEHRADUN**

Present: Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.C.Dhyani

----- Chairman

Hon'ble Mr. Rajeev Gupta

-----Vice Chairman (A)

CLAIM PETITION NO. 06/DB/2022

Smt. Suman Kutiyaal w/o Sri N.S.Dattal, aged about 53 years, Block Development Officer, Block Kalsi, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.

.....Petitioner

vs.

1. The Secretary, Rural Development Department, Govt. of Uttarakhand.
2. The Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
3. Chief Development Officer, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
4. Smt. Shilpi Pant, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
5. Shri Himanshu Joshi, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
6. Shri Vikram Singh, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
7. Shri Vivek Kumar Upadhyay, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
8. Shri Pradeep Kumar Pandey, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
9. Shri Anand Singh, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
10. Shri Sanjeev Kumar Rai, Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
11. Shri Ajay Singh, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
12. Shri Ashish Punetha, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
13. Shri Sushil Mohan Dobhal, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
14. Shri Pushpendra Singh, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
15. Shri Kailash Nath Tiwari, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.

16. Km. Nalineet Ghildiyal, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
17. Km. Rama Goswami, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
18. Shri Moh. Aslam, Project Conviner, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
19. Shri Gopal Giree Goswami, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
20. Dr. Mahesh Kumar, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
21. Shri Ved Prakash, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
22. Shri Sunil Kumar, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
23. Shri Vimal Kumar, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
24. Smt. Sangeeta Arya, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
25. Shri Kamlesh Kumar Pant, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
26. Smt. Nirmala Joshi, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
27. Km. Suman Rana, District Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
28. Km. Manvinder Kaur, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
29. Shri Ramesh Chandra, Block Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
30. Km. Vimee Joshi, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
31. Km. Tara Hyanki, Assistant Project Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
32. Km. Sudha Kafola, Assistant Project Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
33. Km. Chanda, Assistant Project Director, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
34. Shri Dinesh Singh Digari, Block Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.
35. Smt. Aneeta Panwar, Block Development Officer, c/o the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, Pauri, Uttarakhand.

.....**Respondents.**

Present: Dr. N.K.Pant, Advocate for the Petitioner
Sri V.P.Devrani, A.P.O., for the State Respondents

JUDGMENT**DATED: JANUARY 13, 2022****Justice U.C.Dhyani (Oral)**

By means of the present claim petition, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs:

“(i) Issue an order or direction calling for the record and directing the respondents to implement the Government Order 564 dated 10.07.2018, the S.T. Commission communication dated 09.12.2021 and 28.10.2021 and communication no. 2056 dated 20.11.2021 of the Commissioner, Rural Development, Pauri and fixed the seniority of the petitioner at serial no. 21 i.e. below Smt. Hemanti Gungiyal and above of the Smt. Anita Bisht and grant all consequential benefits from the date of 09.11.2000.

(ii) Issue an order or direction calling for the record and to direct the respondent to pay the admissible arrears with interest.

(iii) Issue any suitable claim, order of direction which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

(iv) Award the cost of claim petition in favour of the petitioner.”

2. The petitioner prays for direction to the respondents for implementing the G.O. No. 564 dated 10.07.2018 and letters/ communications dated 09.12.2021/ 28.10.2021 of the S.T. Commission (for short ‘the State Commission’) and Communication dated 20.11.2021 of the Commissioner, Rural Development, Pauri. The petitioner also prays for fixing her seniority at sl. No. 21 i.e. below Smt. Hemanti Gungiyal and above Smt. Anita Bisht. Petitioner also prays for all consequential benefits, flowing from the seniority, w.e.f. 09.11.2000. The claim petition has been filed on 27.12.2021.

3. At the very outset, learned A.P.O. objected to the maintainability of the claim petition, *inter-alia*, on the ground that the same is barred by limitation.

4. Annexure: A1 is copy of G.O. under the signatures of Principal Secretary, Rural Development to the Commissioner, Rural Development, on 10.07.2018. According to such G.O., the petitioner was adjusted in the cadre post on 09.11.2000 and therefore, she is entitled to consequential benefits *w.e.f.* 09.11.2000.

5. It is always open to the Government to direct its subordinates to grant consequential benefits *w.e.f.* 09.11.2000 from the actual date of appointment/the date of adjustment of the petitioner. Annexure: A1 was issued on 10.07.2018. The time period of enforcing the said order before this Tribunal is one year. If said order was not complied with and the petitioner wanted to enforce it through Tribunal, the claim petition ought to have been filed on or before 10.07.2019. As has been stated above, the claim petition has been filed on 27.12.2021, which is beyond time.

6. Dr. N.K.Pant, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner belongs to S.T. Category, therefore, she made a complaint to the State Commission. The State Commission acknowledged the receipt of complaint of the petitioner *vide* letter dated 09.12.2021 (Annexure: A2). Before that, State Commission wrote a letter to the Commissioner, Rural Development, Pauri on 28.10.2021 to bring documents for evidence. A letter was written on behalf of the Commissioner, Rural Development to the State Commission on 22.11.2021 (Copy Annexure: A3), informing the State Commission that since the employer of the petitioner is Government, therefore, matter of *inter-se* seniority can only be decided at the level of the Government.

7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, made an endeavour to bring the claim petition within limitation by arguing that since the petitioner belongs to ST Category therefore, she has every right to write

to the S.T. Commission. The Tribunal does not dispute that the petitioner is not entitled to write to the State Commission for her grievances but the facts remain that certain time period has been prescribed for filing reference (petition) before this Tribunal and the petitioner has not filed such reference/petition before the Tribunal within that period. Her representation to the State Commission would still be non-statutory representation for the consideration of limitation before this Tribunal. The petitioner will not be entitled to get the extension of the limitation period by moving non-statutory representation. Had the representation been a statutory representation, the time consumed by the authority concerned in deciding the statutory representation would have been excluded for the purposes of limitation.

8. In a nutshell, to enforce the G.O. dated 10.07.2018 (Annexure: A1), the petitioner ought to have filed claim petition on or before 10.07.2019, which has not been done. It may be made clear, at this stage, that the limitation has been prescribed for the Tribunal and not for the Government. The Government, in the Rural Development Department, can still enforce its order dated 10.07.2018 at its own level. There is no doubt about it.

9. It will be worthwhile to quote the following passage from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttarakhand & another vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & others, (2013) 12 SCC 179, as below:

“Not for nothing, it has been said that everything may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time.”

10. This Tribunal has held, in various recent decisions, that the petition filed by the petitioner before this Tribunal is neither a writ petition, nor appeal, nor application. It is just like a suit, as is evident from a bare reading of Section 5(1)(b) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 (for short, the Act). The words used in Section 5(1)(b) of the Act are-“.....as if a reference were a suit filed in Civil Court so, however, that- (i) notwithstanding the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the

Act (*Limitation Act, 1963*), the period of limitation for such reference shall be one year;"

11. Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 provides for limitation in respect of claim petitions filed before the Tribunal, which reads as below:

"(b) The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) shall mutatis mutandis apply to the reference under Section 4 as if a reference were a suit filed in civil court so, however, that-

(i) Notwithstanding the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the said Act, the period of limitation for such reference shall be one year;

(ii) In computing the period of limitation the period beginning with the date on which the public servant makes a representation or prefers an appeal, revision or any other petition (not being a memorial to the Governor), in accordance with the rules or orders regulating his conditions of service, and ending with the date on which such public servant has knowledge of the final order passed on such representation, appeal, revision or petition, as the case may be, shall be excluded:

Provided that any reference for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 is more than one year, a reference under Section 4 may be made within the period prescribed by that Act, or within one year next after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 1985 whichever period expires earlier:

....."

[Emphasis supplied]

12. The period of limitation, therefore, in such reference is one year. In computing such period, the period beginning with the date on which the public servant makes a statutory representation or prefers an appeal, revision or any other petition and ending with the date on which such public servant has knowledge of the final order passed on such representation, appeal, revision or petition, as the case may be, shall be excluded.

13. It will be useful to quote Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as below:

“Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

[Emphasis supplied]

14. It is apparent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals or applications. Petitioners file claim petitions, pertaining to service matters, before this Tribunal. Claim petition is neither an appeal nor an application. It is a ‘reference’ under Section 4 of the Act, as if it is a suit filed in Civil Court, limitation for which is one year. It is, therefore, open to question whether Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963, has any application to the provisions of the Act [of 1976]. In writ jurisdiction, the practice of dealing with the issue of limitation is different. Also, there is no provision like Section 151 C.P.C. or Section 482 Cr.PC (inherent powers of the Court) in this enactment, except Rule 24 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Procedure) Rules, 1992, which is only for giving effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that inherent power cannot be exercised to nullify effect of any statutory provision.

15. This Tribunal is not exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Act of 1976 is self contained Code and Section 5 of such Act deals with the issue of limitation. There is no applicability of any other Act while interpreting Section 5 of the Act of 1976.

16. It may be noted here, only for academic purposes, that the language used in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (a Central Act) is different from Section 5 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal)

Act, 1976 (a State Act). It is not a *pari materia* provision. Relevant distinguishing feature of the Central Act is being reproduced herein below for convenience:

“21. Limitation- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application—

(a).....within one year from the date on which such final order has been made.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub section (2), an application maybe admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.”

[Emphasis supplied]

17. Section 5(1)(b) provides that (although) the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, *mutatis mutandis* apply to reference under Section 4 as a reference were a suit filed in civil court, but continues to say, in the same vein, that notwithstanding the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the said Act, the period of limitation for such reference shall be one year. Section 5(1)(b) is therefore, specific in the context of limitation before this Tribunal.

18. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act 1976 has used the language “.....a person who is or has been a public servant and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make a reference of claim to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.

18.1 Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) reads as below:

“.....Section 4 of the said Act provides that a person who is or has been a public servant and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may make reference of claim to the Tribunal for redressal of his grievance.....”

18.2 Section 4-A of the Act has also used the words “references of claims” and “reference of claim” in Sub-section (1) and Clauses (a) & (b) to Sub-section (5) of such Section.

18.3 Clause (b) to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act has used the word “reference” in such clause. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act has also used the word “reference”. Sub Section (5-A) to Section 5 of the Act has also used the word ‘reference’ in its text.

18.4 Section 7 of the Act provides for power to make Rules. Clause (c) to Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act provides for “the form in which a reference of claim may be made.”

18.5 Furthermore, the Schedule appended to the Act has also used the words “reference of claim” or “references of claims”. Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1992, provides for the following “(1) Every reference under Section 4 shall be addressed to the Tribunal and shall be made through a ‘petition’ presented in the Form-I by the petitioner.....(2) The petition under sub-rule (1) shall be presented.....”

18.6 The heading of Rule 5 is Presentation and scrutiny of petition.

18.7 Rules 4, 5, 6, 8, 16 etc. use the word ‘petition’, which, in fact, is a “reference”. The petition is only a medium of presentation. The Rules are always subordinate to the Act. The Rules are always supplementary. They are always read with the provisions of the Act. In a nutshell, a petition which is filed before this Tribunal is, in fact, a “reference of claim”.

18.8 ‘Petition’ According to New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary, means “(1) a request, supplication, or prayer; a solemn or formal supplication (2) A formal request, written or printed, addressed to a person in authority and asking for some grant or benefit, the redress of a grievance, etc. (3) *Law* a formal application in writing made to a court, requesting judicial action concerning some matter therein set forth (4) that which is requested or supplicated.”

19. According to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, “where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it.” Section 9 of the Limitation Act, therefore, runs contrary to the interest of the petitioner.

20. It, therefore, follows that the extent of applicability of limitation law is self contained in Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976. Section 5 of the Act [of 1976] is the sole repository of the law on limitation in the context of claim petitions before this Tribunal.

21. To recapitulate, as per the scheme of law, the Tribunal can consider the delay in filing the claim petition only within the limits of Section 5 of the Act [of 1976] and not otherwise. It may be noted here that the period of limitation, for a reference in this Tribunal, is one year. In computing the period of limitation, period beginning with the date on which the public servant makes a representation or prefers an appeal, revision or any other petition (not being a memorial to the Governor), in accordance with the rules or orders regulating his conditions of service, and ending with the date on which such public servant has knowledge of the final order passed on such representation, appeal, revision or petition, as the case may be, shall be excluded. Apart from that, this Tribunal is not empowered to condone the delay on any other ground, in filing a claim petition. It may also be noted here that delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, only in respect of an appeal or an application in which the appellant or applicant is able to show sufficient cause for condoning such delay. A reference under the Act [of 1976] before this Tribunal is neither an appeal nor an application. Further, such power to condone the delay may be available to a Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In such Tribunal, delay in filing application might be condoned under Section 21, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he/she had ‘sufficient cause’ for not making the application within such period. Since this Tribunal has not been constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and has been constituted

under the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, in which there is no such provision to condone the delay on showing such sufficient cause, therefore, this Tribunal cannot condone the delay in filing a claim petition, howsoever reasonable one's plight may appear to be.

22. It may be reiterated, at the cost of repetition, that only a 'reference' is filed in this Tribunal, which is in the nature of a 'claim'. It is not a writ petition, for the same is filed before Constitutional Courts only. Limitation for filing a reference in the Act [of 1976] is one year, as if it were (is) a suit. 'Suit' according to Section 2(l) of Limitation Act, 1963 does not include an application. As per Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no applicability to 'references' filed before this tribunal. Section 5 of the Act of 1976 is self contained code for the purposes of limitation, for a 'reference' before this Tribunal.

23. Philosophy underlying the Law of Limitation may, briefly, be stated thus:

(i) One of the considerations on which the doctrine of limitation and prescription is based upon is that there is a presumption that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent [Salmond's Jurisprudence, eighth edition, pages 468,469].

(ii) The object of the law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by party's own inaction, negligence or laches [AIR 1973 SC 2537(2542)].

(iii) The object of law of limitation is in accordance with the maxim, *interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium*-which means that the interest of the state requires that there should be an end to litigation.

(iv) Statutes of limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose.

(v) Rule of vigilance, which is foundation of statute of limitation, rests on principles of public policy.

(vi) The purpose of Rules of Limitation is to induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming relief.

(vii) Parties who seek to uphold their legal rights should be vigilant and should consult their legal experts as quickly as possible. They cannot sleep over the matter and at a later stage seek to enforce their rights, which is likely to cause prejudice to other parties. This is precisely the reason why periods of limitation are prescribed in many statutes.

(viii) The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy within a time fixed by the legislature [AIR 1958 Allahabad 149(153)].

(ix) Law of limitation is procedural. It would apply to proceedings *i.e.* law in force on the date of institution of proceedings irrespective of date of action- Object of statute of limitation is not to create a right but to prescribe periods within which proceedings can be instituted.

(x) The limitation for institution of a legal action is a limitation on the availability of a legal remedy during a certain period of time. Different periods are prescribed for various remedies. The idea is that every legal action must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The object of legal remedy is to repair a damage caused by reason of a legal injury suffered by the suitor. A legal remedy, therefore, can never come into existence before a legal injury occurs. It is the legal injury that calls legal remedy to life and action. Limitation fixes the life span of a legal remedy for the redressal of a legal injury. It is not considerable that the legislature would fix the limitation to run from a point earlier than the occurrence of a legal injury, after which only a legal remedy can come into existence. Jurisprudentially, therefore, a period of limitation can only start running after an injury has occurred. Then an appropriate legal remedy springs into action.

- (xi) When the language of statute is clear, the court is bound to give effect to its plain meaning uninfluenced by extraneous considerations but where the language of the enactment is not itself precise or is ambiguous or of doubtful import, recourse may be had to extraneous consideration. No exception can be recognized in these rules of construction in the case of Limitation Act [AIR 1941 PC 6 (9)].
- (xii) The Rules of Limitation are, *prima facie*, rules of procedure [AIR 1953 Allahabad 747 (748) (FB)].
- (xiii) When the Act prescribes a period of limitation for the institution of a particular suit, it does not create any right in favour of person or define or create cause of action, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised only within a limitation period and not subsequently.
- (xiv) Section 3 of the Limitation Act puts an embargo on the Court to entertain a suit, if it is found to be barred by limitation.
- (xv) The Court cannot grant any exemption from limitation on equitable considerations or on grounds of hardships [AIR 1935 PC 85].
- (xvi) Section 5 of Limitation Act does not apply to the suit, as the word 'suit' is omitted by the legislature in the language of the said section and therefore delay in filing suit cannot be condoned while invoking Section 5 [2010 (168) DLT 723].
- (xvii) Section 5 deals only with the admission of appeals and applications after time [1952 All LJ (Rev.) 110 112 (DB)].
- (xviii) Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable ground and equity cannot be the basis for extending the period of limitation.
- (xix) Provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act will be applicable not only to an appeal but will also apply to an application.
- (xx) The practical effect of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is the same as that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1962, which also enables a person to apply to the Court even after the period specified for making the application is over, leaving the discretion in the Court to condone or not to condone the delay.

(xxi) Section 5 is not applicable to proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act [1988 All LJ 1279].

(xxii) In cases covered by statutory period of limitation, the limitation sets in by automatic operation of law.

(xxiii) If suit for specific performance of contract has not been filed within prescribed period of limitation, then the same cannot be entertained and the delay cannot be condoned by taking recourse to Section 5, since said provision is for extension of time prescribed in law only in matter of appeals and applications and not in matter of delay in filing of suit resulting in legal bar [AIR 2008 (NOC) Page 2085 (Patna)].

(xxiv) Where an application under Section 9 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was filed after about 4 years from the limitation, the fact that the employee's representation against impugned order of dismissal was pending or that he was making repeated representation would not save the limitation and said delay could not be condoned on that ground.

ORDER

Claim petition is dismissed, as barred by limitation, at the admission stage.

(RAJEEV GUPTA)
VICE CHAIRMAN (A)

(JUSTICE U.C.DHYANI)
CHAIRMAN

DATE: JANUARY 13, 2022
DEHRADUN
KNP/RS