



SUPREME COURT *Chronicle*

Issue XXXIII | July 2026



HIGHLIGHTS

MoU on Bilateral Judicial Cooperation between Supreme Court of India and Supreme Court of the Russian Federation

Mega Awareness Programme on “Empowering Women and Strengthening Institutional Legal Support”, Jammu and Kashmir

International Conference on “Arbitrating Indo-UK Commercial Disputes”, London

Mega Legal Literacy Camp on Constitutional Values and Legal Awareness, Dharamshala

14th St Petersburg International Legal Forum

Celebration of the 12th International Yoga Day across the Supreme Court Registry



Chief Justice's Corner

Dear Readers,

The July edition of the Supreme Court Chronicle provides a glimpse at the Indian Judiciary's continued commitment to building an accessible, technologically resilient and responsive justice delivery system. Over the past month, our collective efforts have remained focused on strengthening institutional capacity while ensuring that constitutional values guide every facet of judicial administration.

This edition highlights our extensive global engagements and legal aid initiatives, including public lectures on Artificial Intelligence and constitutionalism in the United Kingdom, the signing of a historic Memorandum of Understanding with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and mega legal literacy and empowerment programmes in Dharamshala and Jammu and Kashmir.

These developments reflect our belief that international judicial cooperation and technology must serve as instruments for expanding access, and that timely justice must extend beyond courtrooms to encompass every process that protects individual liberty, dignity and access to legal remedies. Furthermore, the past month also included meaningful engagements with diverse institutions of legal education and judicial training.

Discussions during our visit to Queen Mary University of London and our dialogue on safeguarding the rule of law at International IDEA in Sweden restate our shared responsibility to encourage institutions that nurture scholarship, professional excellence, ethical leadership and an unwavering commitment to constitutional ideals.

This edition also presents several important judgments, including the landmark judicial declaration of the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental constitutional right, that reinforce our constitutional governance, public welfare and the sovereign rule of law.

Guided by constitutional values and strengthened through continuous innovation and incessant dialogues, we remain committed to building a justice delivery system that inspires public confidence and faithfully serves the nation.

Happy reading!

Justice Surya Kant

Chief Justice of India

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Centre for Research and Planning (CRP)
Supreme Court of India
New Delhi-110001

Website

<https://www.sci.gov.in/supreme-court-chronicle/>

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Global Engagements

4th Edition of International Conference on “Arbitrating Indo-UK Commercial Disputes”



05 June 2026:

Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered the Inaugural Address at the 4th Edition of the International Conference on the topic “Arbitrating Indo-UK Commercial Disputes”, under the theme “India-UK Economic Partnership: ADR as an impetus for Strengthening the Economic Corridor and Resolving Cross-Border Trade Disputes”

05 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered the Inaugural Address at the 4th Edition of the International Conference on the topic “Arbitrating Indo-UK Commercial Disputes”, under the theme “India-UK Economic Partnership: ADR as an impetus for Strengthening the Economic Corridor and Resolving Cross-Border Trade Disputes” organised by the Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) in London.

He stressed that party autonomy must mean genuine procedural fairness, rather than the ability to engineer the choice of an adjudicator, and called for greater safeguards to preserve independence and neutrality. He also highlighted the need to make arbitration accessible to smaller businesses, start-ups and MSMEs, particularly as India-UK trade expands.

He cautioned against “institutional self-consumption,” observing that international arbitration is increasingly treated as a commercial product to be promoted rather than a mechanism to be refined. He noted that proceedings frequently

absorb the very habits of formal litigation, such as high costs, heavy pleadings, and complex drafting that lead to protracted preliminary disputes over jurisdiction, causing the remedy to resemble the disease it was meant to cure.

Linking arbitration with the India-UK Free Trade Agreement, the CJI called for co-creation rather than comparison between the two common-law systems. He proposed stronger Indo-UK arbitrator training and accreditation, a fast-track mechanism for mid-value disputes, and hybrid Arb-Med-Arb frameworks to preserve commercial relationships.

Concluding, he said arbitration must return to its original purpose of providing parties with a fair, proportionate and timely alternative to national courts. He emphasised that arbitration should not become a “privilege of scale”, but remain an accessible instrument of justice capable of supporting trust and commercial cooperation between India and the UK.

Address at the Oxford Union And Oxford Law Society



06 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered a Solo Address on the topic “Constitutional Promise to Digital Reality: Safeguarding Justice in the Age of AI and Technological Advancement” at an event organised by the Oxford Union at the Debating Chamber of Oxford Union

06 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, addressed the Oxford Union and Oxford Law Society, and spoke on the evolving relationship between constitutionalism, technology and the administration of justice, emphasising that technological advancement must remain anchored to constitutional values, human dignity and the rule of law. In his address titled “Constitutional Promise to Digital Reality: Safeguarding Justice in the Age of AI and Technological Advancement”, he drew an analogy between Oxford’s enduring academic traditions and constitutionalism, observing that while institutions must preserve their foundational principles, they must also evolve in response to changing social and technological realities.

He further linked technological modernisation with the expansion of constitutional rights. Virtual hearings, he noted, can advance the principle of equality under Article 14 by reducing the financial and logistical barriers associated with travel to courts. Live-streaming of proceedings has expanded public access to constitutional adjudication, while the understanding of Article 21 guarantee of life and personal liberty increasingly encompasses access to justice in a digitally dependent society. He cautioned, however, that meaningful digital

access also requires adequate infrastructure, digital literacy and reliable online systems.

He referred to the use of AI in judicial systems in France, Argentina, Brazil, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, including applications relating to case allocation, legal documentation, decision drafting, transcription and judicial research. However, he cautioned that growing technological interconnectedness should not lead to uniformity in legal systems. Comparative judicial dialogue, he said, must respect the constitutional identity, history, linguistic diversity and social conditions of individual nations.

Emphasising the importance of the younger generation of legal professionals, he noted their role in adapting to emerging technologies and making digital transformation within the justice system a practical reality. He concluded that technology must remain an instrument of democracy rather than become its master. Its use, he said, must ultimately serve the constitutional commitments to equality, justice and human dignity, ensuring that the pace of technological innovation does not outstrip society’s commitment to fundamental human values.

Lecture at the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom



08 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, The Right Honourable Lord Reed, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Lord Sales, Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the UK, The Right Honourable Lord Hamblen of Kersey, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Lord Leggatt, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Mr Gourab Banerji and Ms Pinky Anand, Senior Advocates, Supreme Court of India visited the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

08 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered a lecture on “Mediation, Arbitration, and the Courts: Converging Trends in the Indian and English Approaches in Commercial Dispute Resolution” at the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

He spoke about the development of commercial dispute resolution in India, particularly the relationship between litigation, arbitration and mediation. He discussed the growth of arbitration, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the pro-arbitration approach of Indian courts, including limited judicial intervention and the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. He also referred to the increasing procedural challenges and arbitration-related litigation in India and the UK.

He further spoke about the growing role of mediation in commercial disputes, including its roots in Indian traditions of consensual dispute resolution and the development of the present legal framework through Section 89 of the CPC, Salem Advocate Bar Association, Afcons Infrastructure and the Mediation Act, 2023. He discussed pre-litigation mediation, confidentiality, enforceability of settlements and online mediation, and compared the Indian and English approaches, including Halsey and Churchill. He also discussed Processus Conveniens, professional accreditation, institutional infrastructure and confidentiality.

He concluded his lecture by emphasising the need for courts, arbitration and mediation to function as complementary avenues for dispute resolution.

MoU between the Supreme Court of India and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation



23 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, met with Mr Igor Krasnov, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation


23 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, along with the delegation from the Supreme Court of India, was invited to meet with Mr Igor Krasnov, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The meeting was convened in the Marble Hall of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in Moscow, where the deliberations commenced with particular emphasis on the historical and contemporary amicable relations that both nations share.

The discussions highlighted the necessity for cooperation to address emerging challenges, the digital transformation undertaken by the judiciaries of both countries, particularly in the integration of technology and Artificial Intelligence into court procedures to enhance the justice delivery system and facilitate improved access to justice, and included a brief discourse on the significance of high-quality judicial education.

The discussion subsequently shifted towards exploring practical measures to enhance judicial cooperation between the judiciaries of the two States, grounded in the principles of sovereign equality and other recognised international instruments to which both States are parties. Following extensive deliberations between the two Chief Justices and their respective delegations, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, affirming both sides commitment to enhance cooperation through exchange visits, short — and long-term training programmes, and the organisation of joint seminars and conferences.

A key area of collaboration identified by the two States was the exchange of experiences and best practices relating to the use of technology in the administration of justice, with a view to improving judicial efficiency and service delivery. To further this objective, it was agreed that a Joint Working Group would be constituted to develop strategies and mechanisms for sustained technological collaboration and deeper institutional engagement between the two judiciaries.

During the meeting, he spoke about the shared challenges faced by the Indian and Russian judiciaries, particularly the need to preserve public confidence in justice while adapting to rapid technological change. He emphasised technology as a means of improving access to justice rather than a substitute for judicial decision-making, highlighting India's e-Courts Mission Mode Project, electronic filing, digital case management, digitisation of records, virtual hearings and video-conferencing. He also spoke about the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial administration, including SUVAS for translation, the Su-Sahayak chatbot for litigant assistance, and the 'One Case, One Data' initiative, as well as technology-enabled arbitration, online dispute resolution and mediation.



23 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, along with the delegation from the Supreme Court of India, with Mr Igor Krasnov, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation

He further spoke about the limits of technology and the continuing importance of human judgement, noting that AI cannot determine judicial outcomes, assess credibility or exercise discretion, and referring to the ‘Draft Regulations for the Use of AI in the

Judiciary’. He concluded by emphasising India–Russia judicial cooperation, including judicial exchanges, joint training, research partnerships and sharing of best practices, with technological innovation balanced by enduring human values.



*23 June 2026:
Justice Surya Kant,
Chief Justice of India, with
Mr Igor Krasnov, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation*



24 June 2026:

Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, attended the 14th St Petersburg International Legal Forum and addressed the plenary session on “Equal Justice, Equal Law: Access as the Measure of International Law’s Humanity”, at St Petersburg, Russia.

24 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, attended the 14th St Petersburg International Legal Forum and addressed the plenary session on “Equal Justice, Equal Law: Access as the Measure of International Law’s Humanity”. The event was attended by Mr Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Mr Hoang Thanh Tung, Minister of Justice of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Mr Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Professor of International Law and Vice-President of the Russian Association of International Law; and Mr Hugo Mattei, Academic Coordinator of the International University College of Turin. The session was moderated by Ms Alexandra Suvorova, presenter of the Rossiya 24 TV channel.

In his address, he spoke about the centrality of equality to the international legal order, using St Petersburg’s Bronze Horseman and the Thunder Stone as an analogy for the need for a strong foundation underlying international law. He traced the idea of equality before law to different civilisational traditions, including Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*, Roman law, Islamic jurisprudence, and discussed its modern expression in the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

He concluded by stressing that equal justice and equal law must form the foundation of a credible international legal order, requiring sustained collective effort to ensure that the promises of international law translate into meaningful access and remedies for States and individuals alike.

Discussion at International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Sweden



29 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered the Keynote Address on “Safeguarding the Rule of Law – Experiences from India and Sweden”, at International IDEA held at International IDEA Headquarters in Sweden

29 June 2026: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), in collaboration with the Embassy of India, Stockholm, held a conference in Stockholm on “Safeguarding the Rule of Law – Experiences from India and Sweden” where Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered a Keynote Address. The opening remarks were given by Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, Director of Global Programmes at International IDEA, and Mr Anurag Bhushan, Ambassador of India to Sweden. Along with Justice Surya Kant, Ms Charlotte Kugelberg, State Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Sweden, also delivered the Keynote

Address, and the session was moderated by Jonas Hellman and Svenska Dagbladet.

The Chief Justice of India began his address by recalling his previous visit to Sweden, where he had spoken on the discourse of human rights in India. He spoke about the rule of law as the foundation of constitutional democracy, explaining its role in disciplining public power and preventing arbitrariness. He discussed India’s constitutional framework and the respective roles of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary, with particular emphasis on judicial independence and judicial review. He traced the idea of judicial autonomy to India’s traditional conception of



29 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, with Ms Charlotte Kugelberg, State Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Sweden, and Mr Jonas Hellman, Journalist and Moderator, at International IDEA Conference on “Safeguarding the Rule of Law – Experiences from India and Sweden”, held in Sweden

Dharma, illustrated through the story of King Prahlada, and discussed the Basic Structure Doctrine, separation of powers, federalism and democracy, particularly through *Kesavananda Bharati* and *S R Bommai*. He also touched upon the topics of constitutional safeguards for judicial independence, including separation from the executive, financial protections and the collegium system.

He further spoke about the constitutional creativity of the Indian judiciary, particularly the evolution of Public Interest Litigation and expansion of access to justice, as well as the development of Article 21 through landmark

judgments on speedy trial, dignity, livelihood and personal liberty. He highlighted the judiciary’s contribution to environmental constitutionalism, electoral reforms and democratic integrity, and gender justice.

He concluded the address with the observation that India’s constitutional experience demonstrates the universal relevance of constitutionalism and that the strength of a judiciary lies not merely in its willingness to intervene when constitutional values are threatened, but equally in its ability to recognise when deference and restraint are necessary expressions of constitutional fidelity.

Visit to Queen Mary University of London



05 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered a Keynote Address on the topic “The Contribution of Indian Courts Globally Towards Constitutional Jurisprudence” at an event organised by the Queen Mary University of London

05 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, addressed hundreds of students at Queen Mary University of London at an event organised by the Centre for Commercial Law, speaking on “The Contribution of Indian Courts to Global Constitutional Jurisprudence”.

Reflecting on his own journey in law, he recalled growing up in Petwar, a small village in Haryana, and beginning his legal practice at the District Court in Hisar in 1984. He said that his early experiences showed him the difference between the law as it exists on paper and the law as experienced by ordinary litigants.

On the judiciary’s role in sustaining public trust, he said that institutional confidence must be continuously earned through transparency, consistency and a willingness to acknowledge and correct mistakes.

Addressing legal education, he said constitutional principles must inform legal reasoning beyond examinations, requiring lawyers to ask not only whether an action is legally permissible but whether it is constitutionally consonant.

Concluding the interaction, he highlighted the broader social role of the legal profession.

Public Lecture at Birkbeck, University of London



4 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, delivered a public lecture on the topic “Artificial Intelligence and International Law” during an event organised at Birkbeck, University of London

04 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, addressed a gathering at Birkbeck, University of London. In his address, he spoke extensively on the implications of Artificial Intelligence for international law, governance and the administration of justice. He noted that courts across jurisdictions were already confronting issues relating to AI-generated evidence, automated decision-making and digital due process. At the same time, he highlighted the potential of AI to strengthen the administration of justice through legal research, case management, translation, transcription, document classification

and identification of precedents, provided such technologies were deployed responsibly and under appropriate human supervision.

He further identified jurisdiction as one of the principal challenges posed by AI to international law. While international law remains substantially anchored in territoriality, AI systems operate through globally distributed architectures, with data, computational infrastructure, deployment and consequences often spanning several jurisdictions. He emphasised the need for international cooperation in developing an appropriate framework for AI governance. Such a framework would require sustained cooperation among States, international institutions, courts, academic communities, industry and civil society. Concluding his address, he stated that technology was neither inherently beneficial nor harmful and that its impact depended upon the legal, political and ethical frameworks within which it was deployed. He emphasized that AI presents international law with a rare opportunity for renewal, inviting international institutions, courts, and civil society to re-examine existing norms and build a human-centered framework.

Artificial Intelligence, Judicial Independence and the Future of Justice at International Dialogue in Brussels



22 June 2026: Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, delivered Chief Guest Address on Artificial Intelligence, Judicial Independence and the Future of Justice at International Dialogue in Brussels

22 June 2026: Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India delivered a Chief Guest's Address on Artificial Intelligence, Judicial Independence and the Future of Justice at International Dialogue in Brussels.

While delivering the Chief Guest address at the international dialogue organised by the Centre for Indo-European Cooperation (CIEC), Brussels, on the theme "Role of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Judicial Functioning," Justice N. Kotiswar Singh examined the transformative potential of artificial intelligence in judicial administration while firmly reaffirming that adjudication remains an inherently human function which cannot be delegated to machines. The address explored the constitutional, ethical and institutional challenges posed by emerging technologies and highlighted the safeguards necessary to ensure that technological innovation strengthens, rather than undermines, the rule of law.

At the outset, he observed that although artificial intelligence possesses unprecedented capabilities in processing information, identifying patterns and enhancing administrative efficiency, the judicial function extends far beyond mechanical application of legal rules. Courts are entrusted not merely with deciding disputes but with interpreting constitutional values, balancing competing rights, appreciating human circumstances and exercising

informed judicial discretion. These essential elements of adjudication, he emphasised, require empathy, moral reasoning, accountability and conscious human judgment, qualities that artificial intelligence is inherently incapable of replicating.

The address, relying upon the recently published AI Regulations by the Supreme Court distinguished between the legitimate use of artificial intelligence as an assistive technology and its impermissible use as a substitute for judicial decision-making. Through illustrations drawn from comparative jurisprudence, he explained that while algorithmic systems may efficiently perform administrative and research-related functions, they cannot adequately account for the unique facts, individual circumstances and equitable considerations that frequently determine the just outcome of a case. Judicial reasoning, particularly within common law systems, was described as a dynamic process that contributes to the development of legal principles and constitutional doctrine, making it unsuitable for automated decision-making.

Justice N. Kotiswar Singh further emphasised that the preservation of judicial independence and the rule of law must remain the guiding principles governing the integration of artificial intelligence into court systems. In constitutional democracies, courts exist not merely to deliver speedy decisions but to protect fundamental rights, ensure fairness and maintain public confidence in the justice delivery system. While technological tools may improve efficiency and consistency, they must never erode the independence of judges or diminish the human element that lies at the heart of judicial decision-making.

Concluding the address, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed that the future of justice lies not in replacing judges with machines but in enabling judges to perform their constitutional responsibilities more effectively through responsible use of technology. Artificial intelligence, it was emphasised, should remain an instrument that augments judicial efficiency while preserving the independence, accountability, empathy and human judgment that define the administration of justice.

National Engagements

Third Convocation Ceremony of Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur



14 June 2026: Justice J K Maheshwari, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva, Judges, Supreme Court of India; Justice Vivek Rusia, Acting Chief Justice, High Court of Madhya Pradesh; Justice Vivek Agarwal, Judge, High Court of Madhya Pradesh; Justice Rajendra Menon, Chairperson of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and Prof (Dr) Manoj Kumar Sinha attended the Third Convocation Ceremony of Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur



14 June 2026: Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Judge, Supreme Court of India, attended the Third Convocation Ceremony of Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur



14 June 2026: Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva, Judge, Supreme Court of India attended the Third Convocation Ceremony of Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur



*21 June 2026:
Justice Surya Kant,
Chief Justice of India,
addressed the Registry on
the occasion of the 12th
International Yoga Day*

21 June 2026: Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, addressed the Registry on the occasion of the 12th International Yoga Day, highlighting yoga as an integral part of India's cultural heritage and a means of promoting harmony between the mind, body and spirit. He emphasised that yoga offers a practical way of maintaining balance and mental clarity amid the demands of modern life.

Addressing the pressures faced by Registry officials, including heavy workloads, tight deadlines and the demands of supporting the administration of justice, he stressed the importance of prioritising

physical and mental well-being. He noted that even simple practices such as conscious breathing and basic stretching could help reduce stress, improve concentration and build resilience.

The CJI urged officials to view Yoga Day not as a one-day activity but as an opportunity to develop sustainable habits. He encouraged them to incorporate practices such as short meditation or stretching into their daily routines. He thanked the Registry team for organising the event and called for health and mindfulness to become a regular part of their lives.

*21 June 2026:
Justice Surya Kant,
Chief Justice of India, and
Justice PS Narasimha,
Judge, Supreme Court of India
joined the Yoga session
on the occasion of the
12th International Yoga Day*



Inauguration of the Cyber Security and Data Protection Compliance Research Unit



30 June 2026: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah inaugurated the Cyber Security and Data Protection Compliance Research Unit at Chanakya National Law University, Patna

General Council Meeting of the Chanakya National Law University



30 June 2026: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, along with other companion judges, High Court of Patna, attended the General Council Meeting of the Chanakya National Law University in Patna

Justice N. Kotiswar Singh Delivers Distinguished Lecture on Bail Jurisprudence, Judicial Responsibility and Emerging Challenges in the Digital Age



13 June 2026: Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, attended the Interactive Lecture Program on at the Manipur High Court Auditorium under the caption “The High Court of Manipur Distinguished Lecture Series – 2026”

13 June 2026: Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India delivered a comprehensive lecture examining the constitutional philosophy of bail, the evolution of criminal procedure under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and the ethical and institutional challenges confronting the legal profession in an increasingly technology-driven era.

Commencing the lecture with the constitutional foundations of personal liberty, he traced the evolution of the principle that “bail is the rule and jail the exception,” observing that this proposition has never been absolute but has always been balanced against legitimate concerns such as ensuring the accused’s presence during trial, preventing interference with the administration of justice and protecting society.

The address highlighted the contribution of landmark constitutional decisions in shaping modern bail jurisprudence by firmly locating

the law of bail within the guarantees of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and emphasising that pre-trial detention cannot be permitted to assume the character of punishment before conviction.

Lordship examined the persistent disconnect between settled constitutional principles and their practical implementation, noting that despite a robust jurisprudential framework, a substantial proportion of India’s prison population continues to consist of undertrial prisoners. The lecture stressed that meaningful protection of personal liberty requires not only sound legal doctrine but also efficient institutional mechanisms capable of ensuring timely adjudication and speedy trials.

Concluding the lecture, he reaffirmed that constitutional governance depends not only upon sound legislation and judicial precedent but equally upon responsible institutions and ethical legal professionals.

Legal Aid

Mega Legal Literacy Camp on Constitutional Values and Legal Awareness held in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh



06 June 2026: Justice Vikram Nath, Executive Chairman, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) along with Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judges, Supreme Court of India; Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Patron-in-Chief, HPSLSA; Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Executive Chairman, HPSLSA; Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Executive Chairman, HCLSC, attended the Mega Legal Literacy Camp on Constitutional Values and Legal Awareness held in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh

06 June 2026: The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), in collaboration with the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority (HPSLSA), organised a Mega Legal Literacy Camp on Constitutional Values and Legal Awareness at Dharamshala on 06 June 2026 through the District Legal Services Authority, Kangra. Centred on the themes “Fundamental Rights and Duties: Present Scenario” and “Empowered, Capable and Harmonious Society – Constitutional Goal”, the programme sought to deepen public understanding of constitutional values while strengthening access to justice through legal awareness.

The programme was attended by Justice Vikram Nath, Judge, Supreme Court of India & Executive Chairman, NALSA, as the Chief Guest, along with Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judges, Supreme Court of India; Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Patron-in-Chief, HPSLSA; Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Executive Chairman, HPSLSA; Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Executive Chairman, HCLSC, officers of NALSA, judicial officers and other distinguished guests.

In his address, Justice Vikram Nath underscored that legal awareness is indispensable for ensuring that justice reaches every individual, particularly those

living in remote and underserved areas. Reiterating NALSA’s commitment to last-mile justice delivery, Justice Nath urged citizens to uphold constitutional values in their daily lives.

Justice GS Sandhawalia highlighted that legal literacy empowers vulnerable and marginalised communities to realise their rights, while Justice N Kotiswar Singh and Justice Sanjay Karol emphasised that constitutional values and civic responsibility together form the bedrock of an inclusive and participatory democracy. Introducing the theme of the programme, Justice Vivek Singh Thakur stressed the importance of enhancing public awareness of both constitutional rights and corresponding duties.

The programme also witnessed the flagging off of eleven Multi-Utility Vehicles for deployment across the District Legal Services Authorities in Himachal Pradesh to strengthen legal aid outreach in remote regions. Relief assistance was distributed to disaster-affected families, and an exhibition showcasing legal services initiatives was organised. The Mega Legal Literacy Camp reaffirmed NALSA’s commitment to promoting constitutional awareness and ensuring that access to justice is strengthened through informed, empowered and legally aware communities.



06 June 2026:

Justice Vikram Nath, Executive Chairman, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) and Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judges, Supreme Court of India and Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice, High Court of Himachal Pradesh & Patron-in-Chief, HPSLSA, attended the Mega Legal Literacy Camp on Constitutional Values and Legal Awareness held in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh

Mega Awareness Programme on “Empowering Women and Strengthening Institutional Legal Support”, Jammu and Kashmir



20 June 2026: Justice Vikram Nath, Executive Chairman, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) along with Justice S V N Bhatti, Judge, Supreme Court of India and Supervisory Judge for the Jammu and Kashmir Legal Services Authority; Justice Sanjeev Kumar, Chief Justice (Acting), High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and Executive Chairman, Jammu and Kashmir Legal Services Authority, and Judges of the High Court, at the Mega Awareness Programme on “Empowering Women and Strengthening Institutional Legal Support”, held in Jammu and Kashmir

20 June 2026: Jammu and Kashmir Legal Services Authority organised the Mega Awareness Programme on “Empowering Women and Strengthening Institutional Legal Support”, at the Sher-i-Kashmir International Convention Centre (SKICC), Srinagar.

The programme was attended by Justice Vikram Nath, Executive Chairman, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), who also gave the presidential address, along with Justice S V N Bhatti, Judge, Supreme Court of India and Supervisory Judge for the Jammu and Kashmir Legal Services Authority; Justice Sanjeev Kumar, Chief Justice (Acting), High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and Executive Chairman, Jammu and Kashmir Legal Services Authority, and Judges of the High Court. The programme also witnessed the release of “ENDEAVOUR-2025”, comprising a compendium of legal services activities, and the flagging-off of Multi-Utility Vehicles for the

District Legal Services Authorities across the Kashmir Province to strengthen legal outreach in remote and underserved areas.

In his presidential address, Justice Vikram Nath, Executive Chairman, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), emphasised the need to recognise and bridge the continuing gap between women’s rights as guaranteed in law and their meaningful exercise in everyday life. Justice Vikram Nath observed that women do not lack capability or talent, but frequently encounter social and institutional barriers that restrict access to opportunity, dignity and justice. Emphasising that legal equality must be accompanied by social respect, institutional accountability and greater legal awareness, Justice Nath called for building institutions that do not merely recognise women’s rights in law, but actively enable their practical realisation in homes, workplaces and communities.



*20 June 2026:
Justice Vikram Nath,
Executive Chairman,
National Legal Services
Authority (NALSA),
gave the presidential
address at the Mega
Awareness Programme on
“Empowering Women and
Strengthening Institutional
Legal Support”, held in
Jammu and Kashmir*

Justice Vikram Nath chaired Technical Session–I on “Women’s Rights, Legal Empowerment and Access to Justice: Role of Legal Services Institutions”, with Justice S V N Bhatti, Judge, Supreme Court of India, as Co-Chair. The Session focused upon the rights and safeguards available to women under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. In his remarks, Justice Nath underscored the need to ensure safe, dignified and

respectful workplaces for women through effective implementation of the statutory framework governing sexual harassment. He also highlighted the importance of child-sensitive procedures and institutional safeguards under the POCSO Act, and reflected upon women’s dignity, privacy and bodily autonomy in the context of reproductive rights. He emphasised that legal service institutions have a vital role in taking the law closer to communities, strengthening legal literacy and building public trust through a sensitive, accessible and people-centred approach.



20 June 2026: Multi-Utility Vehicles for the District Legal Services Authorities across the Kashmir Province were flagged off

Training Hub

Branch Specific Training for I-B



1 June 2026 & 4 June 2026: Branch Specific Training was conducted for Officers/Officials of the I-B Branch in four batches with the first two batches held on 01.06.2026, followed by the remaining two batches on 04.06.2026. Additional Registrars of I-B Section, Dr Naveen Rawal and Mr Narendra Prasad, along with Resource Persons from the I-B Branch shared insights during the training sessions, covering the areas including filing of fresh cases, lower court and additional party entries, scrutiny of matters, file and paper-book preparation, categorisation, tagging, verification of matters, office reports, and petitioner-in-person matters

Induction Training Programme for newly recruited Junior Court Assistants, 2025 (Batch 4)



02-04 June 2026: Three-day Induction Training Programme was conducted for the fourth batch of newly recruited Junior Court Assistants from 02.06.2026 to 04.06.2026. The programme provided the participants with a comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Supreme Court Officers and Servants Rules, 1961, along with an introduction to Civil and Criminal matters, the principles of Noting and Drafting, functioning of the administrative side of the Supreme Court and other topics essential for their roles. The resource persons for this training were Mr Vipin Mittal, Additional Registrar; Mr Kapil Sharma, Mr Deepak Sharma, and Mr Vinod Kumar Barthwal, Deputy Registrars; Mr Bal Krishan Dubey, Mr Sachin Sharma, Mr Bhupinder Singh Yadav, and Mr Jaidev Joshi, Assistant Registrars; and Ms Geetika Grover, Mr Harsh Kumar, Mr Mohit Jain, Ms Preeti Agrawal, and Mr K B Pujari, Branch Officers

Fresh from the Bench

Mehmood Khan v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2026 INSC 706

“While a single blow does not by itself reduce murder to culpable homicide, it is not relied on in isolation here. Taken together with the sudden and unpremeditated free fight, the mutual provocation, the injuries on both sides, the absence of any prior design to kill, and the absence of repetition or undue advantage, these circumstances establish knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, but not an intention to cause death or to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”

Coram: CJI Surya Kant and Justice V Mohana

Author: Justice V Mohana

In a judgment dated **18 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal filed by Mehmood Khan against the common judgment and order dated 12.03.2019 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore, in Criminal Appeal No. 1376 of 2008, preferred by the appellant along with co-accused Kismatulla @ Guddu, and Criminal Appeal No. 1331 of 2008, preferred by co-accused Hatim Khan, which were heard and disposed of together. Insofar as the present appellant was concerned, the High Court had upheld his conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Aziz Khan and affirmed the sentence of imprisonment for life, and upheld his conviction under Section 307 IPC for attempting to murder Riyasat Khan and the sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment. The Court altered the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part II IPC and, having regard to the fact that the appellant had already undergone more than eleven years of actual incarceration, sentenced him to the period already undergone. The conviction under Section 307 IPC was affirmed, and the sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment thereunder, having run concurrently, was treated as already undergone. The fine, if already deposited, was directed not to be refunded, and if not deposited, the default sentence was not to be enforced. The appellant's bail bonds were directed to stand discharged.

Background

The case has its origin in the election of the Parent-Teacher Association of the Government High School, Village Kotrikalan, Police Station Kurawar, District Rajgarh, Madhya Pradesh on 11.10.2006, where candidates set up by two rival groups, one led by the deceased, Aziz Khan, and the other by the appellant, Mehmood Khan were contesting. The appellant's group allegedly attempted to deter one Devchand from casting his vote and threatened his wife. On this being objected to by Aziz Khan, an exchange of abuses between the two groups escalated into a clash, during which the appellant inflicted a blow with a Gupti (a sword-cane) on the right side of Aziz Khan's abdomen. Riyasat Khan and Shafiq Khan, who intervened to rescue Aziz Khan, were also assaulted and injured. Aziz Khan was rushed to the hospital and died fifty-four days after the incident due to cardiac arrest resulting from septicemia with duodenal perforation traceable to the stab injury. The dying declarations of Aziz Khan attributed the Gupti blow to the appellant. The case was thereafter converted from Section 307 IPC to Section 302 IPC, and the matter proceeded as Sessions Case No. 22 of 2007. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Alteration of conviction:** The Court considered 'whether the conviction under

Section 302 IPC warrants alteration to one under Section 304 IPC along with the question of sentence. The Court observed that the distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ lies in the degree of probability of death resulting from the act.

- **Sudden fight and absence of premeditation:** The Court found that the incident arose out of a sudden quarrel and altercation between the two groups. The appellant had inflicted a single blow with a Gupti on the abdomen of Aziz Khan, and there was no evidence of prior enmity or premeditation between the appellant and the deceased.
- **Intention and knowledge:** The Court held that the circumstances establish knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, but not an intention to cause death or to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
- **Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC:** The Court held that the case falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel,

and without the appellant having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

- **Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC:** The Court held that the conviction under Section 302 IPC warranted alteration to Section 304 Part II IPC, as the appellant had knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, but did not have the intention to cause death.

Outcome and Directions

The Hon’ble Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and altered the conviction under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part II IPC, sentencing the appellant to the period already undergone. The conviction under Section 307 IPC and the sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment thereunder, having run concurrently, were treated as already undergone. The fine, if already deposited, was directed not to be refunded, and if not deposited, the default sentence was not to be enforced. The appellant’s bail bonds were directed to stand discharged. Pending applications, if any, stood disposed of accordingly.

T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd., Through its Secretary 2026 INSC 649

“The 1986 Act creates a special adjudicatory mechanism for consumer disputes. Once that mechanism is validly invoked and the complaint is admitted, the consumer cannot be driven out of that forum merely because the agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause.”

Coram: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice V Mohana

Author: Justice Vikram Nath

In a judgment dated **04 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by T.K.A. Padmanabhan against the judgment and

order dated 04.01.2016 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“National Commission”), which had dismissed his revision petition arising out of Consumer Complaint No. 579 of 2005 against Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited. The Court held

that the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties did not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer fora, and that the National Commission had failed to address the jurisdictional question of whether the complaint could have been referred to arbitration.

Background

T.K.A. Padmanabhan became a member of the respondent society, Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited, in January 2003, and Flat No. 232 was allotted to him under an agreement dated 27.02.2004. On 08.08.2005, he filed Consumer Complaint No. 579 of 2005 before the District Consumer Forum-VII, New Delhi (“District Forum”), claiming compensation for delay in handing over possession of the flat. After the complaint was admitted and notice issued, the respondent filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking reference to arbitration. The District Forum rejected this application on 21.09.2005, holding that the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is in addition to other remedies. The respondent challenged this order before the High Court of Delhi, which set it aside on 30.03.2007 and directed reconsideration. The respondent’s subsequent Special Leave Petition was dismissed by this Court on 28.07.2008. Upon reconsideration, the District Forum, by order dated 27.07.2009, allowed the respondent’s application and referred the parties to arbitration. The appellant’s appeal against this order was dismissed by the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“State Commission”) on 26.02.2013, and his revision petition was dismissed by the National Commission on 04.01.2016, on the ground that the appellant was not a consumer at the time of filing the complaint.

Court’s Reasoning and Key Observations

- **1986 Act a beneficial, additional remedy:** The Court held that the 1986 Act is a

beneficial legislation providing a simple, inexpensive and expeditious remedy, and that Section 3 makes the remedy additional to any other remedy available under law, so that the existence of another forum does not by itself exclude the jurisdiction of the consumer fora.

- **Arbitration clause does not oust Consumer Forum jurisdiction:** The Court held, following *Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. N.K. Modi, Secretary* (1996) 6 SCC 385, *Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha* (2004) 1 SCC 305, *National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy* (2012) 2 SCC 506, and *Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh* (2019) 12 SCC 751, that an arbitration clause in an agreement does not denude the consumer forum of jurisdiction to entertain and decide a consumer complaint.
- **Section 12(4) bars transfer after admission:** The Court held that the proviso to Section 12(4) of the 1986 Act contains a legislative restraint that a complaint, once admitted by the District Forum, shall not be transferred to any other court, tribunal, or authority, and that a private contractual clause cannot defeat this statutory remedy.
- **Reference to arbitration did not give effect to the Scheme of the Act:** The Court held that the approach of the District Forum and the State Commission in referring the parties to arbitration did not give due effect to the scheme of the 1986 Act or to the principle that an arbitration clause does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum.
- **National Commission failed to address the jurisdictional question:** The Court held that the National Commission failed to address the central jurisdictional question of whether the complaint could have been referred to arbitration, and instead dismissed the revision

petition on the ground that the appellant was not a consumer at the time of filing.

- **Delivery of possession does not extinguish the claim for delay:** The Court held that a claim for compensation for delayed possession arises from the period prior to delivery, and that subsequent receipt of possession cannot, by itself, extinguish the right to seek adjudication of such a claim.
- **Merits require adjudication:** The Court held that questions of delay, attribution, acceptance of possession, and entitlement to compensation are matters requiring adjudication on merits, and that it would not be appropriate for the Court to record any finding on the factual controversy between the parties.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The judgment and order dated 04.01.2016 passed by the National Commission, the order dated 26.02.2013 passed by the State Commission, and the order dated 27.07.2009 passed by the District Forum were set aside. Consumer Complaint No. 579 of 2005, renumbered as Complaint No. 712 of 2007, was restored and directed to be placed before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Dwarka, for decision on merits, after affording due opportunity of hearing and leading evidence to both parties. The Commission was directed to make an endeavour to decide the complaint within one year from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Pending applications, if any, stood disposed of.

Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra 2026 INSC 644

“The statutory scheme under which the SPE stands constituted coupled with the jurisdiction conferred on the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt clearly indicate that the SPE cannot be termed to be an ‘intelligence and security’ organisation when it assists the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt in matters specified by Section 7 of the Act of 1981”

Coram: Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice Atul S Chandurkar

Author: Justice Atul S Chandurkar

In a judgment dated **15 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s Criminal Appeal against a direction of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to supply information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding the process of grant of sanction for the first respondent’s prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court maintained the High Court’s judgment and struck down the Notification dated 25.08.2011 issued by the General Administration Department of

the State of Madhya Pradesh, to the extent it excluded the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment of Lokayukt Organisation (SPE) from the applicability of the Act of 2005.

Background

The first respondent, while serving as Town Inspector, Police Station Madhav Nagar, Katni, was implicated by the Special Police Establishment (SPE), Bhopal, in a trap case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. An FIR was registered on 11.04.2017, and the Home Department granted sanction for his prosecution on 20.05.2020. The first respondent sought information regarding the decision-making

process for grant of sanction by an application dated 01.07.2020 under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The request was declined, and the State Information Commission rejected his appeal on 16.12.2020, holding the information exempt under Section 8(1)(h) of the Act of 2005. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in Writ Petition No. 1575 of 2021, found that the investigation had been completed and directed the appellant to supply the information sought.

Before this Court, the appellant, represented by Mr Nishant Katneshwarkar, relied on Section 8(1)(h) of the Act of 2005 and on the Notification dated 25.08.2011, issued by the General Administration Department (GAD) under Section 24(4) of the Act of 2005, by which the Act was made inapplicable to the SPE. The first respondent, represented by Mr Naveen Kumar Singh, submitted that Section 8(1)(h) Act of 2005, was not attracted since the investigation was complete and a charge-sheet had been filed.

During the hearing, the question arose whether the SPE, in assisting the Lokayukt under Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981, could be treated as an ‘intelligence and security’ organisation for the purposes of Section 24(4) of the Act of 2005, and applicability of the Notification dated 25.08.2011 was, prima facie, doubted. The State of Madhya Pradesh, having not appeared on 14.05.2026, was directed to respond. On 20.05.2026, Ms Manisha Karia, Senior Advocate, and Mr Prashant Singh, Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh, were heard. It was submitted that the Notification had not been specifically challenged before the High Court, that the State Legislature was competent to enact the Act of 1981 under Entries 1 and 2 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and that the Notification had been issued on the principle of institutional parity.

Court’s Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Suo motu examination of subordinate legislation:** Referring to *Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat (Magadh Division) v. State of Bihar SLP(C) No. 18983 of 2023* decided on 02.04.2025 and *Bharathidasan University and another v. All India Council for Technical Education and others 2001 INSC 454*, the Court held that absence of a specific pleading challenging the Notification did not preclude examination of its validity, particularly since the State was granted, and availed of, due opportunity to justify the Notification.
- **Grounds for challenging subordinate legislation:** Citing *Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India 1984 INSC 231* and *State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others 2006 INSC 177*, the Court reiterated that subordinate legislation can be challenged, among other grounds, for failing to conform to, or exceeding the authority conferred by, the enabling statute.
- **Meaning of ‘intelligence and security organisations’:** The Court examined the Second Schedule to the Act of 2005, noting that the organisations listed thereunder, such as the Directorate of Enforcement, Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force and National Investigation Agency, are specifically concerned with intelligence and security functions.
- **Limited jurisdiction of the SPE:** The Court held that the SPE, constituted under the Act of 1947, is empowered only to investigate offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 409, 420 and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, and that the Lokayukt under the Act of 1981 has jurisdiction confined to allegations

of corruption against public servants, without any conferment of jurisdiction over intelligence or security matters.

- **Reference to Dr. Nutan Thakur v. State of U.P (Misc. Case No. 1748 of 2013 decided on 02.11.2017):** The Court noted that the Allahabad High Court had similarly held a comparable notification excluding the Lokayukt from the Act of 2005 in Uttar Pradesh to be illegal, as the Lokayukt was concerned with corruption of public servants and not with intelligence and security.
- **Rejection of institutional parity argument:** The Court held that the submission that the Notification dated 25.08.2011 was issued on the principle of institutional parity could not be accepted, given the limited nature of the offences the SPE is empowered to investigate.

Outcome and Directions

1. The judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 20.12.2021 in Writ Petition No.1575 of 2021 was maintained.
2. The Notification dated 25.08.2011 issued by the General Administration Department, to the extent it seeks to exclude the SPE from the applicability of the Act of 2005, was struck down as being bad in law.
3. The Court clarified that it had not examined the applicability of the Notification dated 25.08.2011 vis-à-vis the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences, and that the Notification shall continue to operate to that extent.
4. Subject to the above, the Criminal Appeal was dismissed, and pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.

Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P. 2026 INSC 617

“The purpose of the dependent quota is neither to create a right of succession or inheritance in the dealership nor a reward for lineage. The object is limited and specific: to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer and to ensure continuity in the public distribution system. Once dependency is accepted as the governing criterion, exclusion of a married daughter solely on account of her marital status becomes wholly irrational and self-defeating”

Coram: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha & Justice Alok Aradhe

Author: Justice Alok Aradhe

In a judgment dated **02 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench allowed the appeal filed by the appellant, a married daughter of a deceased fair price shop dealer, against the order dated 05.03.2025 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, rejecting her claim for appointment as a fair price shop dealer on compassionate grounds. The Court held that exclusion of married daughters

from the definition of “family” under Clause 2(p) of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 and Paragraph IV(10) of the corresponding Government Order fails the test of reasonable classification and violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. On a purposive construction, the Court held that “daughters” in Clause 2(p) includes a married daughter who establishes dependency and satisfies the other eligibility conditions under the Government Order.

Background

A fair price shop at village panchayat Aariyawan, Tehsil Tiloi, District Amethi was allotted on 27.10.2012 to Ms Badrun Nisha, the appellant's mother. Under the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016, the State issued GO No 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 for identification, reservation, and appointment of fair price shops in rural areas. Sub-Paragraph 10 of Paragraph IV of the G.O. defines "family" to exclude a "married daughter". Ms Badrun Nisha passed away on 04.03.2024, leaving the appellant as the sole earning member responsible for her four sisters, one of whom is visually impaired. The appellant had continued to reside with her mother and sisters after marriage. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tiloi, by an order dated 16.07.2024, rejected the appellant's application for allotment solely on the ground that she is a married daughter and falls outside the definition of "family" in the G.O. The Deputy Commissioner affirmed this order on 07.01.2025. The High Court dismissed the appellant's Writ Petition by an order dated 05.03.2025, holding itself bound by Division Bench decisions in *Smt. Kusumlata* and I, though it granted a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution on the ground that the matter involved a substantial question of law of general importance.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Classification must satisfy intelligible differentia and rational nexus:** The Court reiterated that a classification under Article 14 must be founded on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, and that State action founded on impermissible stereotypes is equally vulnerable to challenge.
- **Marital status bears no rational nexus to dependency:** The Court held that the

relevant considerations for allotment under the dependent quota are dependency, financial need, residence, and the ability to run the shop, and marital status bears no rational nexus to any of these.

- **Exclusion founded on gender stereotype:** The Court held that the exclusion assumes a daughter ceases to be dependent upon marriage, an assumption not applied to married sons, and is founded on a gender-based stereotype incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality.
- **Residence an independent, fact-specific criterion:** The Court held that local residence is a separate eligibility condition under Paragraph IV(5) of the GO, to be examined on the facts of each case, and cannot justify a blanket exclusion of married daughters.
- **Purposive construction applied:** The Court read the words "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order to include married daughters who establish dependency and satisfy the other eligibility conditions, holding the enumeration illustrative and not exhaustive.
- **Overruling of contrary view:** The Court agreed with the view taken in *Vimla Srivastava* and the Bombay, Karnataka, and Calcutta High Courts, and held that the contrary view in *Saida Begum* and *Smt. Kusumlata* does not lay down the correct law.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court quashed and set aside the orders dated 05.03.2025, 07.01.2025, and 16.07.2024 passed by the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner, and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate respectively. The competent authority was directed to issue the allotment order in favour of the appellant within four weeks. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors.
2026 INSC 647

“If a road exists, there must then be a duty to ensure that a footpath is demarcated and maintained for the walkers. This is an enforceable duty. The citizen’s fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles”

Coram: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S Chandurkar

Author: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

In a judgment dated **19 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while enhancing the compensation awarded to the appellant for the death of his five-year-old son in a road accident, declared the right to walk on demarcated footpaths to be a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, integral to Article 19(1)(d) read with Articles 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and Article 21.

Background

The appellant’s five-year-old son was struck by a tanker and died while walking with his father to school, on a stretch of road with neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing. The claim petition filed by the father for compensation of ₹25,00,000 was considered by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), which by award dated 30.05.2016 granted ₹7,82,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the petition till realisation. In appeals filed by the appellant and the Insurance Company, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and, while allowing the Insurance Company’s appeal, reduced the compensation to ₹4,70,000. This order was under challenge before the Supreme Court.

Court’s Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Fundamental right to walk:** The Court held that the right to move freely under

Article 19(1)(d) is, at its foundation, the fundamental right to walk, which precedes the right to move on wheels, and that this right extends to guaranteeing access to a safe and demarcated footpath, with priority over movement by motorised vehicles.

- **Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 not a protecting statute:** The Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017, are built around the motor vehicle as the subject of regulation, treat pedestrian interests as incidental, and neither recognises the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths nor prioritise it over motorised roads.
- **Need for a statutory framework:** Noting the absence of any legislation on the right to walk on demarcated footpaths, the Court directed the Registry to send a copy of the judgment to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, and to the Law Commission, to consider the necessity of a statutory framework declaring the right, identifying duty bearers, and providing remedies.
- **Restitutionary remedy:** The Court held that violation of the right to walk on demarcated footpaths entitles a citizen to a restitutionary remedy under the Constitution or under Sections 38-40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, enforceable against Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities or Panchayats, independent of any claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

- **Recalculation of compensation:** Applying the method adopted in *Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, 2025 INSC 1244* (concerning a similarly aged deceased minor), the Court recalculated the compensation using the wage prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for a skilled worker, with 40 percent added for future prospects, 50 percent deducted for personal and living expenses, and a multiplier of 18, arriving at ₹10,11,528 towards loss of dependency, ₹96,800 towards loss of consortium, ₹18,150 towards loss of estate, and ₹18,150 towards funeral expenses.

Outcome and Directions

1. The appellant(s) was entitled to compensation of ₹11,44,628, to be paid within a period of two months.
2. The Court declared: (a) the right to walk, including the right to demarcated footpaths, is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, with priority over movement by motorised vehicles; (b) this right carries a correlative duty on urban development

authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats to demarcate, construct, maintain and safeguard footpaths; and (c) violation of the right entitles citizens to constitutional and legal remedies for restitution and compensation, independent of remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

3. The Registry was directed to send a copy of the judgment to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, and to the Law Commission, for consideration of the necessary legal framework.
4. The Registry was directed to re-number the case as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, changing the cause title to *Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath*, with the Government of India, through the said three Ministries, impleaded as a party, and Mr KM Nataraj, ASG, requested to assist the Court.
5. The appeal(s) and pending application(s), if any, were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis 2026 INSC 616

“Once proceedings under Section 33 are initiated and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, the award remains subject to the limited jurisdiction of the tribunal for correction, interpretation, or supplementation as contemplated under the provision. So long as such proceedings remain pending, the parties cannot be compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 merely as a matter of abundant caution”

Coram: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe

Author: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

In a judgment dated **02 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal

filed by the Appellant, setting aside the judgment and order dated 22.01.2024 of the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, which had set aside an order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary condoning delay in filing applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996. The Court held that where a request under Section 33 of the Act has been made, the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 is to be reckoned from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal, irrespective of whether the Section 33 application is ultimately allowed or dismissed.

Background

Land belonging to Respondent No.1 in Bellary District was acquired pursuant to a preliminary notification dated 15.12.2009 issued under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, and vested in the Central Government by a declaration dated 14.12.2010 under Section 3D(2). Compensation was determined by the competent authority by an award dated 05.12.2011 under Section 3G(1) of the 1956 Act. On a reference under Section 3G(5), the Arbitrator redetermined the market value by an Award dated 16.02.2013, which the High Court set aside on 16.03.2019 and remitted for *de novo* consideration. On remand, the Arbitrator passed a fresh Award on 03.02.2022. The Appellant filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act seeking correction of the Award, and Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 33(4) seeking an additional award. Both applications were dismissed by the Arbitrator by a common order dated 04.07.2022. The certified copy of this order was received by the Appellant on 15.09.2022. The Appellant filed applications under Section 34 of the Act along with applications for condonation of delay on 29.10.2022. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, condoned the delay by an order dated 05.08.2023. Respondent No.1 challenged this order in a Writ Petition. The High Court, by judgment and order dated 22.01.2024, held that the Appellant's application under Section 33(1)(a) was not maintainable and that the benefit of limitation under Section 34(3) was unavailable, and dismissed the arbitration applications.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Section 34(3) does not distinguish between outcomes:** The Court held that Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 that are allowed or dismissed, and does not confine the benefit only to applications ultimately held maintainable, as the legislature would have expressly said so.
- **Limitation runs from disposal of Section 33 proceedings:** The Court held that once proceedings under Section 33 are entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, parties cannot be compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 during their pendency, and limitation under Section 34(3) can start only from the date such proceedings are disposed of.
- **Maintainability not determinative:** The Court held that whether an application under Section 33 ultimately succeeds or fails is not determinative for Section 34(3), and what matters is whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 was formally invoked and remained pending.
- **State of Arunachal Pradesh distinguished:** The Court held that *State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. , (2007) 10 SCC 742* was inapplicable, as that case involved a letter seeking review rather than a formal application under Section 33, whereas formal applications had been filed and disposed of by common order in the present case.
- **Contrary view would cause multiplicity of proceedings:** The Court held that the interpretation adopted by the High Court would defeat the scheme of the Act by compelling parties to institute Section 34 proceedings out of abundant caution during the pendency of Section 33 proceedings, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and procedural uncertainty.

- **Safeguard against frivolous applications:** The Court clarified that where applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, or mala fide, or filed solely to defeat limitation under Section 34(3), courts would be justified in imposing exemplary and punitive costs.
- **Not res Integra — *Geojit Financial Services*:** The Court held that the issue was no longer res integra, and reaffirmed that the date of disposal of the application under Section 33 earmarks the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Section 34, as held in *Geojit Financial*

Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav, 2025 INSC 1021.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order dated 22.01.2024 of the High Court. The order dated 05.08.2023 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, condoning the delay in filing the applications under Section 34 of the Act, was restored. The applications under Section 34 of the Act were directed to be decided on their own merits, in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed, and pending applications, if any, stood disposed of.

Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. 2026 INSC 632

“The options open for the referee Judge, when seized of a reference under section 392 of the 1973 Code are not too wide. If a Judge of a Bench of two-Judges, while hearing an appeal, is inclined to maintain a conviction while the other Judge is not so inclined, the third Judge may accept either opinion and it is the third Judge’s opinion that the statute requires to be placed before the Division Bench for rendering the final judgment”

Coram: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

Author: Justice Dipankar Datta

In an order dated **09 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, hearing separate appeals of the complainant, Rakesh Kumar Gupta, and the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment and order dated 22 March 2018 of a learned Single Judge (referee Judge) of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad acquitting Anil, Ajay and Atul Rastogi, recorded its respectful disagreement with the decision in *Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315* and referred the question whether that decision lays down correct law to a larger Bench.

Background

Anil, Ajay and Atul Rastogi, along with their father and one Giriraj Rastogi, were tried by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, arising out of Case Crime No.120/1991 under Sections 148, 149 and 302/149 IPC. The father died during the trial. By judgment dated 31 January 2001, the Sessions Judge convicted the siblings and sentenced them to life imprisonment, while acquitting Giriraj Rastogi. The siblings’ composite appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Bhanwar Singh and Devi Prasad Singh, JJ.), which delivered separate judgments on 11 July 2006: Bhanwar Singh, J. upheld the conviction of Anil and Ajay but acquitted Atul, while Devi Prasad Singh, J. maintained the conviction of all three

siblings. The Judges thus differed only in respect of Atul. The appeal was referred to a third Judge (Vikram Nath, J., as His Lordship then was) under Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The referee Judge, by the impugned judgment, agreed that Atul should be acquitted, and additionally reversed the concurring findings of Bhanwar Singh, J. and Devi Prasad Singh, J. against Anil and Ajay, acquitting them as well.

The complainant's special leave petition was permitted and notice issued on 08.10.2018, and notice on the State's special leave petition was issued on 02.08.2019. The appeals were heard on 02.02.2026, with Mr. Mudit Sharma appearing for the complainant, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Counsel, for the siblings, and Mr. Chandrika Mishra for the State.

The Court framed three questions on the scope of Section 392 of the 1973 Code: (i) whether the third Judge, upon a division of opinion, is obliged to agree with one of the two opinions or may render a divergent opinion; (ii) whether the third Judge is confined to the points of disagreement or may differ even from conclusions unanimously reached by the two Judges; and (iii) whether, in case of disagreement with concurrent findings, the third Judge is bound to refer the appeal to be re-heard by a larger Bench.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Distinction between Section 429 of the 1898 Code and Section 392 of the 1973 Code:** The Court noted that while Section 429 required 'the case' to be placed before another Judge, Section 392 uses 'an appeal' followed by 'the appeal', and held that this difference in phraseology is significant.
- **Grammatical construction:** The Court held that 'an appeal' is the indefinite article introducing any appeal under Chapter XXIX heard by a Bench that results in a divided

opinion, while 'the appeal', used anaphorically, refers back to and narrows the scope to the specific appeal in which the disagreement occurred.

- **Scope of reference to the third Judge:** Since Bhanwar Singh, J. and Devi Prasad Singh, JJ. were unanimous in confirming the conviction and sentence of Anil and Ajay, and differed only in respect of Atul, the Court held that only Atul's appeal ought to have been placed before the third Judge, and not the appeals of Anil and Ajay.
- **Disagreement with *Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh* (1999) 1 SCC 315:** The Court held that *Sajjan Singh* (supra) is not an authority on the construction of 'an appeal' vis-à-vis 'the appeal' in Section 392, as it did not advert to the anaphoric use of the definite article, and is therefore distinguishable on the point of statutory interpretation.
- **Potential for anomalous results:** The Court observed that a mechanical application of *Sajjan Singh* (supra) could result in a third Judge reversing findings of acquittal unanimously recorded by two Judges of a Division Bench in respect of convicts on whom there was no disagreement, a situation it considered not to have been visualised in that decision.
- **Order of this Court dated 18 March 2015:** The Court treated the observations made in the earlier order permitting withdrawal of the appeals of Anil and Ajay as obiter, noting it was not necessary for that order to have indicated how the appeal was to be heard and decided.

Outcome and Directions

1. The Court recorded its respectful disagreement with the view expressed in *Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, (1999) 1 SCC 315, and referred the question whether *Sajjan Singh*

- (supra) lays down correct law for decision to a larger Bench, of such strength as the Chief Justice may constitute.
2. The Court reserved its answers to the second and third questions formulated in paragraph 8 of the order.
 3. The appeals were directed to be laid before an appropriate Bench for pronouncing the final judgment, after the larger Bench delivers its opinion.

**CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited
2026 INSC 629**

“An appeal under Section 62, IBC does not remain alive after the 28 (twenty-eight) day period allowable under the SCR for curing defects and the lis would stand frozen once the defects are not cured within such period. An extended window cannot be granted de hors the legislative intent behind stipulation of the strict timelines in the IBC”

Coram: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

Author: Justice Dipankar Datta

In a judgment dated **01 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Under challenge was the order and judgment dated 08.12.2025 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi in *Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 2316 of 2024*. The Hon’ble Court sees no reason to comment or otherwise on the impugned order. The Court dismissed the defective appeal as time-barred, having been filed beyond the maximum period condonable in terms of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).

Background

CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary, who was the liquidator of a corporate debtor under liquidation, filed the present appeal. The appeal was presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed in sub-

section (1) of Section 62, IBC but within the grace period stipulated in sub section (2) thereof. The office reported a delay of seven days in filing the appeal. An application seeking condonation of the said delay was filed. The office had also marked the appeal defective. Upon curing the defects, the appeal was refiled after a further delay of eighty-two days for which a separate application seeking condonation of delay in re-filing was also filed.

Court’s Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Strict and time-bound scheme of limitation:** The Court held that the scheme of limitation under the IBC is a strict and time-bound one. Section 62 permits an appeal within 45 days, with a further grace period of 15 days, subject to sufficient cause being shown, making 60 days the outer limit statutorily permissible.
- **Defective appeal and curing of defects:** The Court held that an appeal under Section 62, IBC, to be regarded as having been instituted within the prescribed period, must be a defect-free appeal capable of being acted upon by the Registry. Curing of defects in a defectively

filed appeal is permissible within 28 days of notification by the Registry. However, there being no scope for curing defects after lapse of 28 days, filing of an application for re-filing delay does not arise.

- **Right to appeal stays extinguished:** The Court held that no litigant can be permitted to subvert the statutory scheme by seeking condonation of re-filing delay beyond 28 days. Once the window of 60 days under the IBC, followed by the window of 28 days for curing defects, is shut, the right to appeal stands extinguished..
- **IBC prevails over Supreme Court Rules:** The Court held that the Supreme Court Rules are subordinate legislation and, whenever the IBC and the Rules clash, the latter cannot override the express provisions of the former. The IBC must prevail being the statutory edict.

- **Article 142:** The Court observed that the appellant's status as a neutral officer acting under the aegis of the Court was not sufficient to invoke Article 142 to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes engrafted under the IBC.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed the defective appeal as time-barred, having been filed beyond the maximum period condonable in terms of the IBC. The Court found sufficient cause not having been shown to satisfactorily explain the delays in filing and re-filing and, absent any cogent or convincing justification, held that the delays in both the filing of the defective appeal and re-filing of the appeal were not liable to be condoned. The connected applications were accordingly dismissed.

Bhikhani Devi And Etc. v. Union of India 2026 INSC 612

“Pension is not a matter of grace dependent upon the financial convenience of the employer, but a deferred wage earned through long years of service”

Coram: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih

Author: Justice Sanjay Karol

In a judgment dated **01 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by Bhikhani Devi, Bahuru Sahu, and Pitamber Jha, setting aside the impugned judgments of the High Court that had reversed orders of the Tribunal granting them pensionary benefits. The Court held that a temporary status casual labourer under the Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in the absence of formal regularisation as a Group ‘D’

employee. Arrears were confined to the period of three years and two months preceding the filing of the respective original applications before the Tribunal. The Respondents were directed to release the pensionary and consequential retiral benefits within three months, failing which interest at 6 percent per annum would be payable.

Background

Late Suraj Sah, Bahuru Sahu, and Pitamber Jha were casual labourers in the Department of Posts conferred “temporary status” with effect from 29.11.1989 under the Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991. By a circular dated 30.11.1992,

the Department decided that casual labourers completing three years of continuous service with temporary status would be treated at par with “temporary Group ‘D’ employees”. None of the Appellants or their predecessors-in-interest were formally regularised. Late Suraj Sah retired on 31.12.2008 and passed away on 10.04.2015; Bahuru Sahu retired on 30.04.2008; and Pitamber Jha retired on 31.10.2015. Their claims for pension were rejected on the ground that formal regularisation was a mandatory prerequisite. The Tribunal allowed their original applications, but the Union of India’s writ petitions succeeded before the High Court, which set aside the Tribunal’s orders on grounds of delay and laches and absence of formal regularisation, leading to the present appeals.

Court’s Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Scheme a beneficial, progressive framework:** The Court held that the 1991 Scheme was conceived as a beneficial and progressive framework intended to extend Group ‘D’ benefits to temporary status casual labourers, and could not be read to defeat that object.
- **Circular benefits illustrative, not exhaustive:** The Court held that the words “such as” in the circular dated 30.11.1992 indicated that the enumerated benefits were illustrative, not exhaustive, and could not be read to exclude pensionary benefits.
- **Clause 6 an additional benefit, not a precondition:** The Court held that Clause 6 of the Scheme, providing for counting of 50 percent of temporary-status service towards retirement benefits after regularisation, confers an additional benefit and does not itself create the pensionary entitlement.
- **Parity in benefits, not identity of status:** The Court observed that temporary status does not make a casual labourer a temporary

Government servant, but after three years of service the Scheme extends to such employees the benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees.

- **Pension as a constitutional right:** The Court reiterated that pension is not a bounty but a vested and enforceable constitutional right and “property” within the meaning of Article 300A, not to be denied on the ground of financial burden.
- **Rule 10(1-B), CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965:** The Court held that Rule 10(1-B) entitles a temporary Government servant retiring on superannuation after not less than ten years of temporary service to pension under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, an entitlement that could not be selectively denied.
- **Delay and laches:** The Court held that a claim for pension is a continuing cause of action and cannot be defeated solely on delay, though arrears remained confined to three years and two months preceding the Original Applications.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the Impugned Judgments of the High Court and held that a temporary status casual labourer is entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even without regularisation. Bhikhani Devi was held entitled to the benefits accrued to Late Suraj Sah together with family pension; Bahuru Sahu and Pitamber Jha were held entitled to pensionary and consequential retiral benefits, with arrears confined to three years and two months preceding the filing of the Original Applications. The Respondents were directed to release the benefits within three months, failing which interest at 6 percent per annum would apply. The Appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India 2026 INSC 643

“If this Court accepts such argument to find out such glaring cases, which are required to be interfered with under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India and the other set of cases in which the rejection is not so improper prima facie relegating them to avail the remedy of filing election petition, this Court would be reading some principle which is not provided for under Article 329 of the Constitution of India”

Coram: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Atul S Chandurkar

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra

In a judgment dated **12 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the rejection of nomination for a seat in the biennial election for the Rajya Sabha seats of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held the petition not maintainable in view of the express bar contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India.

Background

The petitioner, a candidate belonging to the Indian National Congress, submitted her nomination for the Rajya Sabha election. The Returning Officer rejected the nomination by order dated 09.06.2026 on the ground that the petitioner did not disclose the pendency of a criminal case against her in the Form-26 affidavit, thereby suppressing material information. The order noted that a court had taken cognizance of the criminal complaint against the petitioner, that summons had been issued to her, and that she had also filed her statement before the Magisterial Court concerned. The petitioner thereafter approached the Election Commission of India with a written representation and argued in person on 10.06.2026, but no orders were passed by the Commission. Hence, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Bar under Article 329(b):** The Court while relying upon Article 329 of the Constitution and Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, held that Article 329(b) bars any court, including the Supreme Court under Article 32, from entertaining a challenge to matters connected with the election process except by way of an election petition.
- **Reliance on *Ponnuswami*:** The Court set out extensively from *N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Ors.* (1952) 1 SCC 94, including its holding that the word ‘election’ in Article 329(b) is used in the wide sense to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected, and that the improper rejection of a nomination paper is a ground to be raised only by way of an election petition before the appropriate tribunal.
- **Prior application in *Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.* 2025 INSC 1284:** The Court referred to this recent decision, concerning non-disclosure of a prior conviction by a candidate for the post of Councillor in a Nagar Parishad, applying Rule 24-A(5) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994.
- **Rejection of a ‘glaring illegality’ exception:** The Court declined to accept the submission that it should intervene where the illegality in rejection of a nomination is glaring and manifest, holding that carving out such an exception would amount to reading into

Article 329 a principle not provided for therein, and would conflict with the law laid down in *Ponnuswami*.

Outcome and Directions

1. The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was held not maintainable in view of the express bar under Article 329(b), and was dismissed.

2. The Court clarified that any observation made concerning the basis of rejection of the petitioner's nomination was only for the purpose of appreciating the facts of the case, and that nothing in the order would affect any election petition that may be filed by the petitioner or any other person before the concerned High Court, which would be decided on its own merits, in accordance with law.

The Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Kalu Ram and Others 2026 INSC 653

“The case before us concerns the loss of a young life with promising professional potential, and the determination of compensation under the MV Act is ultimately guided by the principle of awarding ‘just compensation’. This principle is not one of exact mathematical equivalence, rather it is an attempt by the law to provide a measure of solace, within human limitations, to those who have suffered an irreparable loss”

Coram: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria

Author: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

In a judgment dated **23 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India partly allowed the appeals arising out of the common judgment dated 08.08.2022 passed by the High Court of Delhi, which had affirmed the award dated 30.11.2017 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Saket Courts, New Delhi. The case arose from a motor vehicle accident dated 11.06.2013 resulting in the death of Akash Kumar, aged about 20 years. While the insurer challenged the findings on negligence and quantum of compensation, the claimants sought enhancement. The Supreme Court dismissed the insurer's appeal and partly allowed the claimants' appeal by awarding ₹80,000 towards filial consortium, thereby enhancing the total compensation from ₹81,21,900 to ₹82,01,900, with interest as awarded by the Tribunal.

Background

The proceedings arose from a motor vehicular accident dated 11.06.2013, in which 20-year-old Akash Kumar was travelling in a Wagon-R driven by his roommate, Nikhil Kumar Jain. At about 3:00 AM, near Andrews Ganj Bus Stop, Delhi, the vehicle collided with a truck allegedly parked without parking lights, indicators, reflectors or warning signs, resulting in Akash Kumar's death. The parents of the deceased thereafter instituted a claim petition under Sections 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation. The Tribunal attributed the accident to the negligence of the truck driver and awarded compensation of ₹81,21,900 with interest at 9 percent per annum. The High Court dismissed the separate appeals preferred by the insurer and the claimants and affirmed the award. The insurer thereafter approached the Supreme Court challenging negligence and quantum, while the claimants sought enhancement.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Just compensation under the MV Act:** The Court reiterated that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is guided by the principle of “just compensation” and does not require mathematical exactitude. While future prospects may be considered, the assessment must remain compensatory and cannot extend into speculation or conjecture. The alleged private tuition income and prospective earnings as a Chartered Accountant were not supported by cogent material warranting further enhancement.
- **Negligent stationing of truck:** The Court upheld the concurrent finding that the truck driver was negligent in leaving the truck stationed on the road at about 3:00 A.M. without parking lights, indicators, reflectors or warning signs, which constituted the proximate cause of the accident.
- **Contributory negligence not established:** The Court held that the mere fact that the Wagon-R collided with the truck from behind did not establish negligence on the part of its driver. In the absence of cogent evidence supporting the plea of contributory negligence, the insurer's contention was rejected.
- **Concurrent findings on negligence not interfered with:** The Court reiterated that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Article 136 of the Constitution is ordinarily warranted only where such findings are perverse, manifestly erroneous or unsupported by evidence, and found no such infirmity in the present case.
- **Forward-looking assessment of income:** The Court observed that the Tribunal had assessed the deceased's monthly income at ₹55,500 by considering his CA Final status, articleship, educational progression and prospective professional advancement, rather than confining the assessment to his proved stipend.

- **No further enhancement or reduction of loss of dependency:** The Court held that the Tribunal had already adopted a substantially enhanced benchmark reflecting the deceased's future earning potential and had additionally awarded 50 percent towards future prospects. It therefore found no basis either for further enhancement sought by the claimants or for reduction sought by the insurer.
- **Filial consortium as a conventional head:** The Court held that the parents of an unmarried deceased are entitled to compensation under the head of the filial consortium, in accordance with the principles recognised in *Pranay Sethi* and *Magma General Insurance*. Accordingly, ₹40,000 was awarded to each parent, enhancing the total compensation to ₹82,01,900.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the insurer and partly allowed the claims filed by the claimants. While considering the quantum of compensation, the Court applied the principle of “just compensation” under the Motor Vehicles Act, as explained in *National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others*, (2017) 16 SCC 680, including the principles governing addition towards future prospects. The Court also relied upon *Pranay Sethi* and *Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and Others*, (2018) 18 SCC 130, recognising filial consortium as a compensable conventional head for the parents of an unmarried deceased. Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court was enhanced by ₹80,000 towards filial consortium, with ₹40,000 awarded to each parent. The total compensation was accordingly enhanced from ₹81,21,900 to ₹82,01,900, together with interest at the rate awarded by the Tribunal. The insurer was directed to deposit the enhanced amount before the Tribunal within four weeks from the date of the judgment. The appeals were accordingly disposed of in these terms.

Mohammed Khaleel (D) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Jayamma 2026 INSC 651

“The term ‘readiness’ refers to the financial capacity, and the term ‘willingness’ reflects the conduct and intention of the party seeking the relief to perform the contract. Thus, both these conditions cumulatively have to be seen for making out a case of specific performance”

Coram: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria

Author: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

In a judgment dated **23 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff, Mohammed Khaleel, against the judgment and order dated 09.12.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court at Bangalore in *R.F.A. No.418 of 2003*, which had set aside the decree for specific performance granted by the Trial Court and dismissed the suit.

Background

The original plaintiff and the respondent/defendant, Jayamma, entered into an agreement to sell dated 20.12.1990 for a vacant site of 100 feet by 78 feet for a sale consideration of ₹3,00,000, of which ₹25,000 was paid as earnest money, with the sale deed to be registered within four months and the balance of ₹2,75,000 payable at registration. The plaintiff was put in possession of the property, and a dispute arose over the formation of an approach road, which the defendant denied having agreed to. A series of legal notices followed between April 1991 and August 1992: the plaintiff's notice dated 15.04.1991 was not served due to a wrong address; the defendant's notice dated 26.04.1991 sought rescission of the agreement and forfeiture of the earnest money, citing the plaintiff's failure to obtain permission under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCRA) and expiry of time; the plaintiff's notice dated 30.04.1991

admitted that no approach road had been made; and further notices dated 30.07.1992 and 11.08.1992 were exchanged, with the defendant alleging that the plaintiff's conditions showed unwillingness to perform.

The plaintiff filed Suit O.S. No.432 of 1993 on 20.12.1993 before the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mysore, seeking specific performance and possession, or alternatively compensation of ₹3,00,000. PW-1, a legal representative of the plaintiff, deposed, and 29 documents were exhibited, including four Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) of ₹70,000 each; the defendant led no oral evidence. The Trial Court decreed the suit on 31.01.2002, holding that possession was delivered on 20.12.1990, that time was not of the essence, that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform, and that the defendant had rescinded the contract without justifiable cause. The High Court reversed this decree, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness, that his failure to submit a ULCRA affidavit showed unwillingness, and that the delay of two years and nine months in filing the suit, though within limitation, was critical.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Statutory requirement of continuous readiness and willingness:** The Court reiterated that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as it stood prior to the amendment dated 01.10.2018) required the plaintiff to aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his

obligations, relying on *N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Others* (1995) 5 SCC 115, *His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar* (1996) 4 SCC 526, *Umabai and Another v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRs. and Another* (2005) 6 SCC 243, and *Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha* (2010) 10 SCC 512.

- Financial readiness: The Court found that the four FDRs relied upon by the appellants were dated 04.10.1999, 22.11.1999, 03.04.2001 and 23.08.2001, all created several years after the suit was filed on 20.12.1993, and therefore could not establish financial readiness at the relevant time.
- ULCRA permission: The Court noted that the testimony of PW-1 showed the plaintiff had not furnished the necessary affidavit or forms for ULCRA clearance and had remained passive, which established a failure to prove continuous readiness and willingness.

- Effect of delay on equitable relief: Relying on *Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and Others* (2024) 13 SCC 80, and the decisions referred to therein, including *K.S. Vidyadnam v. Vairavan* (1997) 3 SCC 1, *Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani* (2009) 17 SCC 27, *Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi* (2011) 12 SCC 18, and *Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh* (2020) 3 SCC 311, the Court held that a suit for specific performance filed within limitation but after unexplained delay reflects an absence of continuous readiness and willingness, and found the plaintiff's filing of the suit after two years and nine months to be such a case.

Outcome and Directions

1. The Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate their readiness and willingness to perform the contract and failed to approach the Court with promptitude, disentitling them from the discretionary relief of specific performance.
2. The appeal was dismissed.

Shankar Dutt v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others 2026 INSC 656

“When it comes to assessing the compensation in the context of the injury suffered, what matters is the extent by which the functions of an injured person suffers, and not what the doctor may have judged in terms of medical standards”

Coram: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice NV Anjaria

Author: Justice NV Anjaria

In a judgment dated **24 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court further enhanced the motor accident compensation payable to the appellant, a carpenter whose right leg was amputated above the knee following a road accident, from ₹11,51,423 as awarded by the High Court of Uttarakhand to ₹35,95,923, with interest

at six percent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till actual payment.

Background

On 09.11.2004, the appellant, then 38 years old and engaged as a carpenter, suffered grievous injuries to his right leg when a Jeep, driven rashly and negligently on the wrong side of the road, struck his motorcycle near Kotdwar. His right leg was amputated above the knee, and he was hospitalized

for about 43 days. He filed a claim petition seeking ₹18,50,000 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kotdwar, Pauri Garhwal, against the Insurance Companies of the two vehicles and the driver-owner of the Jeep. The Claims Tribunal, by award dated 02.03.2012, granted Rs 4,77,823 with interest at four percent per annum. In appeal, the High Court of Uttarakhand, by judgment dated 19.12.2019, enhanced the compensation to ₹11,51,423 with interest at six percent per annum, raising the monthly income from ₹3,000 to ₹5,000, while reducing the multiplier from 17 to 15 and maintaining the permanent disability at 70 percent.

Before this Court, the appellant's counsel, Mr Ashwani Garg, sought further enhancement on several counts, including a higher notional income, a higher multiplier, 100 percent functional disability instead of 70 percent, and additional amounts for the prosthetic leg, attendant charges, transportation, and pain and suffering. Counsel for the Insurance Companies, Mr Abhishek Gola and Mr KK Bhat, supported the High Court's assessment of income and disability; none appeared for the driver-owner, Respondent No.3, though served.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Carpentry as skilled work:** Referring to *State of Orissa and Others v. Adwait Charan Mohanty and Others*, *Neeta and Others v. Divisional Manager, Maharashtra SRTC, Kolhapur*, (2015), and *Karamjit Singh v. Amandeep Singh and Another*, 2024, the Court held that a carpenter is a skilled worker, a factor that could not be overlooked while notionally assessing income.
- **Fair notional income:** Noting the appellant's unrefuted evidence of earning ₹8,000 to ₹10,000 per month, and drawing guidance from *Chameli Devi v. Jivrail Mian and Others*, 2019 ACJ 3011, and *Jagdish v. Mohan*

and Others, (2018), the Court assessed the appellant's income at ₹9,000 per month, holding that the High Court had erred in restricting it to ₹5,000.

- **Multiplier:** Applying *Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.*, (2009), the Court maintained the multiplier of 15 as correct for the appellant's age of 38 years at the time of the accident.
- **Loss of earning capacity:** Citing *Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another*, (2011), the Court reiterated that the percentage of permanent disability should not be mechanically equated with the percentage of loss of earning capacity.
- **Medical versus functional disability:** Relying on *R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited*, (2026), and *S. Ettiappan v. D. Kumar* (2026), where a loader with a similarly amputated leg was held to suffer 100 percent functional disability despite a 70 percent medical disability, the Court held that since carpentry requires the ability to sit in a squatted or cross-legged position, which the appellant could no longer do, his functional disability had to be assessed at 100 percent, not the 70 percent medically certified.
- **Heads of compensation:** Referring to *Mohd. Sabeer alias Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation*, (2023), *Anant v. Pratap and Another*, (2018), and *R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others*, (1995), the Court reiterated the distinct pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads of compensation payable to an injured claimant.
- **Prosthetic leg expenses:** Considering the appellant's age of 38, an average life expectancy of 75 years, and the periodic replacement and maintenance costs of a prosthetic limb noted in *Mohd. Sabeer (supra)*, the Court awarded ₹10,00,000 towards the cost and maintenance of the artificial leg.

- **Future prospects:** Applying *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi*, (2017), the Court added 40 percent towards future prospects to the assessed income.
2. The appellant was held entitled to the said total compensation of ₹35,95,923 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till actual payment.
 3. The additional compensation payable was directed to be disbursed by the Claims Tribunal, after due identification and verification, directly to the appellant's bank account.
 4. Respondent No.1, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., was directed to deposit the balance additional amount of ₹24,44,500 (₹35,95,923 minus ₹11,51,423), with interest at 6 percent per annum, with the Claims Tribunal within six weeks.
 5. The appeal was allowed in the aforesaid terms, and any pending Interlocutory Application was held not to survive.

Outcome and Directions

1. The compensation was recalculated as follows: loss of future earnings (monthly income ₹9,000; yearly income ₹1,08,000; future prospects at 40 percent making it ₹1,51,200; multiplier of 15 making it ₹22,68,000; at 100 percent disability, ₹22,68,000), pain, shock and suffering ₹1,00,000, expenses towards prosthetic leg ₹10,00,000, loss of income during the laid-up period ₹13,500, attendant charges ₹50,000, nutrition and other incidental charges ₹40,000, medical expenses ₹44,423, transportation charges ₹30,000, and loss of amenities ₹50,000, totalling ₹35,95,923.

Mathu Alias Jagdish V. State of Uttarakhand 2026 INSC 658

“... Section 304 IPC has got two parts. The first part is attracted if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death... The second part of Section 304 IPC would be attracted if the act by which the death is caused is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death”

Coram: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan And Justice Arun Palli

Author: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

In a judgment dated 25 June 2026, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, partly allowed the criminal appeal filed by Mathu alias Jagdish against the judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand, which had affirmed his conviction under Section 304/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for five years. The Court held that, having regard to the evidence on record,

the case attracted Part II of Section 304 IPC, as fatal injuries were primarily attributable to the deceased's fall into the dry, rocky canal, with no evidence or forensic report supporting the allegation that the appellant caused the injuries by throwing stones. Considering the lapse of nearly three decades, that the appellant was over 60 years of age, and that he had already undergone imprisonment for over one and a half years, the Court maintained his conviction but altered the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The appellant's bail bond was accordingly discharged.

Background

The appellant, Mathu alias Jagdish, along with Manua alias Puran and Ramu, was prosecuted under Section 304/34 IPC for the death of Padam Singh Shahi following an altercation on 12.02.1997. The Sessions Court convicted all three under Section 304/34 IPC and sentenced each to five years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of 2,000, while acquitting Kaley alias Kaloo. The High Court of Uttarakhand affirmed the conviction and sentence, prompting the accused to approach the Supreme Court. During the appeal, Manua and Ramu died and the proceedings abated against them, leaving Mathu alias Jagdish as the sole surviving appellant. The prosecution alleged that the accused assaulted Padam Singh, pushed him into a dry canal, and that Mathu struck him with a stone, causing his death. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and circumstances to determine the legality of the appellant's conviction and sentence.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Application of Section 304 Part II IPC:** The Court noted that neither the Trial Court nor the High Court had specified which part of Section 304 IPC applied. It held that Part I requires intention, whereas Part II requires only knowledge of the likelihood of death without such intention, the Supreme Court held that Section 304 Part II IPC was attracted, as the case involved knowledge of the likelihood of death rather than an intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.
- **Stone-throwing allegation not established:** The Court found the allegation that Mathu had thrown stones at the deceased, causing the fatal injuries, to be implausible. The injuries were not consistent with being caused by stones that could ordinarily be lifted and thrown by a person.

- **Absence of forensic corroboration:** Although the Investigating Officer had seized a stone and sent it for forensic examination to determine whether it bore human blood matching that of the deceased, no forensic report was produced in evidence.
- **Genesis of the incident:** The Court took into account that the incident originated from an altercation concerning the return of a wristwatch and subsequently escalated into a scuffle, during which the deceased fell into the dry canal.
- **Passage of nearly three decades:** The Court gave significant consideration to the fact that the incident had occurred on 12.02.1997 and that by 2026 nearly three decades had elapsed. The appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the incident, was by then over 60 years of age.
- **Sentence modified to period already undergone:** Considering the passage of time, the circumstances of the incident, the nature of the appellant's role, and the fact that he had already undergone more than one and a half years of imprisonment, the Court held that the ends of justice would be met by reducing the sentence from five years' rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone, while maintaining the conviction.

Outcome and Directions

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the appellant's conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC while modifying the sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone. The Court took into account the appellant's having undergone more than one and a half years of imprisonment and the fact that nearly three decades had elapsed since the incident. As the appellant was already on bail, his bail bond was directed to stand discharged.

Rajat Kumar v. S.D. Adarash Jain Kanya Mahavidyalaya Sadhaura
2026 INSC 648

“Once the decrees passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff were set aside, there would be no occasion for the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings since there would be no decree holding the field for being executed. In such a situation, directing the Executing Court to assess the value of the wall in question would be requiring it to undertake an exercise not supported by any decree whatsoever”

Coram: Justice SVN Bhatti and Justice Atul S Chandurkar

Author: Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

In a judgment dated **19 June 2026**, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed civil appeals filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, Om Parkash, and set aside the common judgment dated 02.05.2016 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 363 of 2008 and 364 of 2008. The Court found that the High Court had erred in reversing decrees passed in favour of the plaintiff by directing the defendants to pay compensation assessed by a valuer, in the absence of any such prayer in the suits.

Background

The original plaintiff filed Civil Suit No.426 of 1996 seeking mandatory injunction for removal of an alleged encroachment in the form of a wall constructed by the defendants on the common open space beyond his house, and permanent injunction restraining further construction. The Trial Court decreed the suit on 06.02.2006, and Regular Civil Appeal No.137 of 2006 filed by the defendants was dismissed on 05.09.2007. The plaintiff also filed Civil Suit No.148 of 2000 seeking removal of a lintel of a school building erected by the defendants on the wall of his house, which was decreed on 08.11.2004; the defendants’

Regular Civil Appeal No.143 of 2004 was likewise dismissed on 05.09.2007.

The defendants preferred Regular Second Appeal No.364 of 2008 and Regular Second Appeal No.363 of 2008 before the High Court. By judgment dated 25.11.2011, the High Court disposed of the Second Appeals by directing the defendants to pay Rs 10,000 and Rs 7,000 respectively, with interest at 12 percent per annum, being half the cost of construction of the walls, on payment of which the walls would be treated as “common” between the parties. The legal heirs of the plaintiff challenged this before the Supreme Court, and by order dated 13.09.2013 in Civil Appeal Nos.8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013, this Court held that modification of the decrees without entering into the merits, and without any substantial questions of law having been framed, was impermissible; the High Court’s judgments were set aside and the matters remanded for fresh consideration.

On remand, the High Court, by common judgment dated 02.05.2016, again set aside the decrees passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first Appellate Court, and directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction through a valuer, with the defendants to deposit the assessed amount for payment to the legal heirs. Aggrieved, the legal heirs of the plaintiff preferred the present appeals. There was no appearance on behalf of the respondents since 23.04.2019, and the Court

heard Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Key Observations

- **Absence of prayer for compensation:** The Court noted that the original plaintiff had sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of the encroachment and the lintel, with no prayer for damages or compensation, and that the legal heirs had not consented to accept compensation in lieu of the decrees passed in their favour.
- **No decree to execute:** The Court held that once the decrees passed in favour of the plaintiff were set aside, there was no decree for the Executing Court to execute, and directing it to assess the value of the wall was an exercise not supported by any decree, nor by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
- **Repetition of an error previously set aside:** The Court observed that the High Court, on remand, again directed valuation and compensation in monetary terms, notwithstanding that a similar exercise undertaken by it earlier, had already been set aside by this Court's order dated 13.09.2013.

- **Factually incorrect premise:** The Court found that the High Court proceeded on the wrong premise that the Trial Court had recorded a finding that the wall was a common wall, when no such finding had in fact been recorded, and that the impugned judgment did not indicate that the questions referred to therein had been treated as substantial questions of law before being answered in the defendants' favour.

Outcome and Directions

1. The common judgment dated 02.05.2016 passed by the High Court in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 363 of 2008 and 364 of 2008 was set aside.
2. Since the appeals had not been adjudicated on merits, the High Court was requested to reconsider both Second Appeals in accordance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decide them on their own merits.
3. The High Court was requested to consider the Second Appeals from the year 2008, expeditiously,
4. The Civil Appeals were allowed in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.

Bid Adieu



30 June 2026: Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, attended the retirement function held to felicitate the retiring employees at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi



*30 June 2026:
Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Gopal Dutt Pathak, Usher, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi*



30 June 2026:

Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Suresh Kumar Tiwari, Usher at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi

*30 June 2026:
Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee Shri Ganesh Dutt Agria, Restorer Grade-I, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi*




30 June 2026:

Justice N Kotiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Ashok Kumar, Restorer Grade- I, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi



30 June 2026:

Justice N Kottiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Ganesh Chandra, Restorer (Library) Grade -I, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi



30 June 2026:

Justice N Kottiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Satinder Dhiman, Assistant Registrar, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi



30 June 2026:

Justice N Kottiswar Singh, Judge, Supreme Court of India, presented a memento to felicitate the retiring employee, Shri Ravi Prakash Verma, Additional Registrar, at the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi




Beyond the Court: Creativity Abound

World Environment Day (June 5, 2026)



“The Silent Trail”

Picture by:
Deepak Dhyani
Junior Court Assistant



*“A wishful serenity
in the mountains”*

Picture by:
Ashneet Kaur
Junior Court Assistant

World Blood Donor Day (June 14,2026)



World Blood Donor Day – A Proud & Humbling Milestone

On the occasion of World Blood Donor Day (14 June 2026), I had the privilege of being invited by Safdarjung Hospital Blood Bank and was deeply honoured to be felicitated for completing 135 voluntary blood and platelet donations.

This recognition is not mine alone - it belongs to every blood donor, volunteer, supporter, and well-wisher who has stood beside me throughout this journey. Your encouragement and unwavering support have been my greatest source of motivation to continue serving humanity.

Every blood donation is a priceless gift. Just a few minutes of our time can become a lifetime of hope for someone battling a serious illness. A single donation has the power to save multiple lives and bring relief to countless families.

On this special day, I sincerely appeal to all healthy individuals to become regular voluntary blood and platelet donors. Together, we can build a society where no patient suffers due to a shortage of blood or platelets.

**A drop of blood can become someone's ray of hope.
Donate Blood. Donate Platelets. Save Lives.**

by:

Rohit Garg

Branch Officer, Caretaking Branch

World Blood Donor Day

World Blood Donor Day is observed every year on 14 June to raise awareness about the importance of voluntary blood donation. It is a day to thank blood donors for their selfless contribution and to encourage more healthy people to donate blood. Blood donation is one of the simplest ways in which a person can help save another person's life.

Blood is an essential part of the human body. It carries oxygen and nutrients to different parts of the body and helps fight infections. In hospitals, blood is needed for patients who have suffered serious accidents, undergone major surgeries, or are suffering from diseases such as anaemia, cancer, and blood disorders. Women may also need blood during complications related to childbirth. Without a sufficient supply of safe blood, many lives can be at risk.

World Blood Donor Day was established by the World Health Organization (WHO) and is observed on the birth anniversary of Karl Landsteiner, the scientist who discovered the ABO blood group system. His discovery made blood transfusion much safer and contributed greatly to modern medicine. The day provides an opportunity to recognise the contribution of voluntary blood donors around the world.

Blood donation is generally a safe and simple procedure for eligible donors. Before donating, the donor's health and basic medical information are checked. A small amount of blood is collected using sterile equipment. The donated blood is then tested, processed, stored and supplied to hospitals for patients who need it. The body naturally replaces the donated blood over time.

One of the most important messages of World Blood Donor Day is that voluntary, unpaid blood donation is a noble act. A person may never know whose life their donated blood will save. It could help a child suffering from a serious illness, an accident victim, a patient undergoing surgery, or a mother facing complications during childbirth.

The day also highlights the need for a regular and reliable supply of blood. Blood cannot be manufactured in factories; it can only come from generous human donors. Therefore, hospitals and blood banks depend on voluntary donors. Regular donation by eligible people helps ensure that blood is available when emergencies occur.

Young people can also contribute by spreading awareness among their families, friends and communities. However, blood donation should always be done through authorised blood banks or recognised donation camps and only by people who meet the required health and eligibility conditions.

World Blood Donor Day teaches us the values of kindness, compassion and social responsibility. Donating blood does not take away our humanity; instead, it gives another person hope and a chance to live.

In conclusion, blood donation is a precious gift that costs nothing but can mean everything to someone in need. We should respect and appreciate every voluntary blood donor and encourage eligible people to donate blood regularly. One donation can make a difference, one donor can save lives, and together we can build a healthier and more caring society.

by:

Sonia Bhasin

AR-cum-PS

Father's Day (June 20, 2026)

Father's Day

My Dad is like a shining sun, He makes my life so full of fun.
He holds my hand and walks with me, and teaches me what I should be.
He works so hard both day and night, to make my little world feel right.
He wipes my tears when I am sad, and cheers me up when I feel bad.

He teaches me to dream and fly, to reach for stars up in the sky.
He says, "Be brave and do your best, and always give your heart some rest.

He gives me hugs and makes me smile, He makes each day worthwhile.
Whenever I am lost or blue, I know my Dad will see me through.

When I am scared, he makes me brave, When I am sad, my tears he save,
When I am wrong, he helps me learn, and shows me how the tables turn.

So on this special Father's Day, I have some loving words to say:
Thank you, Dad, for all you do, For being wonderful and true

You are my hero, my shining star, The best Dad, just as you are.
I love you more than words can say - Happy Father's Day.

by:
Sonia Bhasin
AR-Cum-PS

ऐसे थे मेरे प्यारे पापा

गोदी में ले मुझे खिलाया,
थपकी देकर मुझे सुलाया
सुबह सुबह मेरी नींद खुले तब,
प्यार से माथा था सहलाया

उंगली पकड़ चलना था सिखाया
अच्छे बुरे का भेद कराया
कन्धे पर मुझको बैठा कर
दुनिया का था सैर कराया

मंद बुद्धि थी मेरी लेकिन
फिर भी मुझमें विश्वास जगाया
काली नजरो से मुझे बचाने
काला टीका था लगवाया

रात को मुझको आसमान में
तारों का इतिहास बताया
चंदा को फिर पास बुलाकर
हाथ मेरा उनसे मिलवाया

कभी-कभी जब खेल खेल में
गिर जाता था जो जमीन पर

मुझे उठाकर गोद में अपने
चींटी मर गई था दिखलाया
मैं पढ़ने में विद्वान नहीं था
धरती का मेहमान नहीं था
कूट के भर दी जिम्मेदारी
ज्ञान का दर्शन था करवाया
दुनिया का हर इल्म सिखाया
मुझे तपा हीरा था बनाया
कितने भी हालात हो मुश्किल
मुस्कुराकर हर रोग भगाया
जिसका केवल साथ ही काफी
लक्ष्य फतेह करने के लिए
वो पिता ही मेरे हैं सरताज
जो कभी ना मुश्किल से घबराया

आसमान के तारों को भी
गिनती करके था बतलाया
ऐसे थे मेरे प्यारे पापा
मुझमें जिसने उम्मीद जगाया

by:
Mohd Tasvirul Islam
Assistant Librarian



Supreme Court of India

Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110001

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