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DISMANTLING CULTURAL STEREOTYPES: INSIGHTS FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S HANDBOOK TO COMBAT GENDER STEREOTYPES

In the pursuit of equal rights for all, the Supreme Court of India has taken a significant step forward by issuing guidelines to combat harmful gender stereotypes that perpetuate inequality. The Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which lays out a set of dos and don'ts for judicial decision-making and writing, assists judges in identifying language that promotes outdated and "incorrect ideas," particularly about women, and provides alternative terms and phrases. The use of stereotypes violates the constitutional concept of "equal protection of the laws," which states that the law should apply equally and impartially to all individuals, regardless of what position they hold in a group or category. The employment of prejudices by judges also has the consequence of entrenching and propagating stereotypes, producing a vicious cycle of unfairness.

Using predefined preconceptions in judicial decision-making violates judge's obligation to consider each case on its own merits, independently and impartially. Reliance on preconceptions about women, in particular, has the potential to skew the law's application to women in detrimental ways. Even if the employment of stereotypes has no effect on the outcome of a case, stereotyped language may propagate beliefs that are opposed to our constitutional ethos. Where the vocabulary of judicial discourse reflects outmoded or inaccurate beliefs about women, the transformational purpose of the law and the Indian Constitution, which strives to provide equal rights to all individuals, regardless of gender, is thwarted.

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The handbook distinguishes three sorts of stereotypes: those based on so-called intrinsic traits of women, those based on gender roles of women, and those connected to sex, sexuality, and sexual violence. It also provides for suggested language for the judges and legal professionals, instead of "affair," it is expected to use the phrase "relationship outside of marriage"; similarly, for "adulteress" the preferred language is "woman who has engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage." A slew of disparaging and ostensibly moderate terms have also been discarded when referring to women. For example, "chaste" lady, "dutiful" wife, "housewife" is no longer required; a simple "woman," "wife," and "homemaker" will suffice. Men have not been forgotten, with the Court striking down phrases like "effeminate" (when used derogatorily) and "faggot" with the injunction, "accurately describe the individual's sexual orientation (e.g. homosexual or bisexual)". It identifies common presumptions about the way sexual harassment, assault, rape, and other violent crimes are viewed, which are skewed against women, pointing out that stereotypes — "a set idea that people have about what someone or something is like, especially an idea that is wrong" — lead to exclusion and discrimination.

In a primarily patriarchal society, females are frequently compelled to choose marriage as a means out of social stigma rather than education and a profession. No doubt, if things are changing, but are changing slowly. To achieve gender equality, fundamental adjustments must be done to eliminate all preconceptions. Women are more loving and more able to care for others, that they should undertake all home duties, are just incorrect beliefs. The handbook may serve as a guide for judges and legal professionals, but it may also serve as an ignition for change on a cultural level.

It is beautifully acknowledged that the handbook primarily focused on gender stereotypes concerning women, and that it is important to recognize that stereotypes impact individuals across the gender spectrum, while also stating that "Judges must be vigilant against all forms of gender biases and ensure that every person, regardless of their gender identity, is treated equally and with dignity before the law." The Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes is an eye-opener and a must-read for everyone in and outside of the legal community.

Ajay Kumar Sharda Director (Administration)

PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED FOR A CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH LAW BETWEEN THE AGE GROUP OF 16-18 YEARS WHO HAS COMMITTED HEINOUS OFFENCE

'Nirbhaya Case' was another milestone in the Juvenile Justice System which forced us to rethink about the children in conflict with law (hereinafter referred to as CCLs) within the age bracket of 16-18 years and who have been alleged to have committed heinous offences as one of the accused in the said case was juvenile but he had committed the most brutal act with the deceased victim apart from committing gang rape with her along with other accomplices. However, being juvenile, he escaped the sentence granted to his accomplices. Thereafter, the previous Act of 2000 was repealed and new Act of 2015 known as 'The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015' came into enforcement.

This Act of 2015 brought change with regard to procedure to be adopted for the CCLs falling within the age group of 16-18 years who have been alleged to have committed an heinous offence. Thus, in order to understand the procedure to be adopted for such CCLs, we need to know the definition of heinous offences. Section 2(33) of the JJ Act, 2015 defines this term as "the offences for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more." Hence, apart from the condition that age of such CCL should be within age group of 16-18 years, another stipulation is that such CCL must have been alleged to have committed an offence which is not punishable less than seven years either under IPC or any other law which is in force on the date of commission of an offence.

Now in order to understand the procedure to be adopted for such CCLs we have to take assistance of sections 14, 15, 18, 19, 20 read with Rule 10A, 11& 13 of JJ Model Rules, 2016 as amended in the year 2021.


At the first instance, the Board has to determine about the age of the CCL. If the CCL is of 16 years or above and has committed an offence punishable with minimum sentence of 7 years, the Board has to conduct a preliminary assessment (within a period of 3 months from the date of first production of the child before the Board) with the help of psychologists or psycho social worker of other experts having experience of working with children in difficult circumstances. Further, District Child Protection Unit is under the obligation to provide the names of such experts. The Boardhas also to take assistance

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from the Social Investigating Report and has to conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to four aspects i.e. mental capacity, physical capacity of CCL to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he /she allegedly committed the offence. If the Board is satisfied that the CCL should be tried as a child, it shall conduct the inquiry as summons case and dispose of the matter in accordance with section 14 of the Act and pass dispositional order as per section 18 of the Act by making Individual Care Plan as part of it.

If the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 passes an order that there is need for trial of the child as an adult, then Board has to order for transfer of trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.

On receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15, the role of Children's Court as described under Section 19 of the Act read with Rule 13 of Model Rules, 2016 as amended in the year 2021 can be understood with the help of flow chart as under –



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6.While examining a child in conflict with law and recording his statement, Children's Court shall encourage him to speak without fear: (a) in respect of offence alleged against the child (b) In respect of the home, social surrounding and influence to which the child might have been subjected.(R.13(7)(v))

7.Dispositional order shall necessarily include an Individual Care Plan in Form 7 to be prepared by PO/CWPO/CWO/recognized voluntary organization after interaction with child and his family, where possible.(R.13(7)(vi))

8. Children Court may pass any orders as in S.18 (1) & (2)

6. Children's Court may also direct the child to be produced before it periodically and at least once every 3 months for assessing the progress made by the child and the facilities provided by the Institution for implementation of Individual Care Plan.(R.13(8)(v))

7. When child attains age of 21 years and his term of stay is not completed Children's Court shall (R.13(8)(vi)): -

> (a) Interact with the child in order to evaluate whether the child has undergone reformative changes and if the child can be a contributing member of the

(b)Take into account the periodic reports of the progress of the child prepared by District Child Protection Unit or a social worker, if needed and further direct that institutional mechanism if inadequacy is to be strengthened.

(c) After evaluation Children's Court may decide

(i) Release the child

forthwith

(cb)Release the child on execution of personal bond with or without sureties for good behaviour.

(cc) Release the child and issue directions regarding education, vocational training, apprenticeship, employment, counselling and other therapeutic interventions with a view to promoting adaptive and positive behaviour etc. (cd)Release the child and appoint a Monitoring Authority for the remainder of the prescribed term of stay. The Monitoring Authority shall maintain a Rehabilitation Card for the child in Form No.14.

Q. Who can be Monitoring Authority? A Probation Officer/Case Worker/CWO/a fit person can be appointed as a Monitoring Authority. (R.13(8)(vii)(a))
DCPU shall maintain a list of such persons and send to CC bi-annual updates.(R.13(8)((vii)(b))
For the first quarter after release, the child shall meet M.A. fortnightly or as decided by CC. The M.A. shall fix time and venue of such meetings in consultation with the child.The M.A. will forward its observation to the CC on a monthly basis. After the first quarter, the child shall meet the M.A. as directed by the CC. (R.13 $(8)((vii)(c))$
The M.A., at the end of the first quarter shall make recommendations regarding further follow up procedure. (R.13 (8)((vii)(d))
Where after release, the child is found to be indulging in criminal activities or associating with people with criminal antecedents, he shall be brought before CC for further orders. (R.13(8)(vii)(e))
If it is found that the child no longer requires to be monitored, the M.A. shall place the detailed report with recommendations with report before CC. The CC shall issue further directions either terminating the monitoring or for its continuation. (R.13(8)(vii)(f))
After the first quarter, the child shall meet the M.A. at such intervals as may be directed by CC made by the M.A. at the end of the first quarter and M.A. shall forward its report to CC which shall review the same every quarter. (R.13 (8)(vii)(g))

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To conclude, following points must be kept in mind:

 Though four aspects have been discussed in the Act to be considered by the board at the time of preliminary assessment but no guidelines have been issued how to have insight in those aspects. The factors to be considered while making the preliminary assessment can be borrowed from the case of USA titled as Kent v. United States [383 U.S. 541 (1966)] which is as follows:

- a) The seriousness of the alleged offence to the community and whether protecting the community requires waiver;
- b) Whether the alleged offence was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willed manner;
- c) Whether the alleged offence was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offences against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
- d) The prosecutive merit, i.e. whether there is evidence upon which a court may be expected to return an indictment;
- e) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offence in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offence are adults;
- f) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
- g) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation or prior commitments to juvenile institutions;
- h) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offence) by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court. (Mumtaz Ahmed Nasir Khan vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. Crl. Appeal No. 1153 of 2018 Criminal Writ Petition No. 1346 of 2018 with Crl. Application No. 262 of 2018 decided on 15.07.2019)

Even for preliminary assessment, "Guidance Notes on Preliminary Assessment Report for Children in Conflict with Law Department of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, NIMHANS, Bengaluru" can be referred to. (Barun Chandra Thakur vs. Master Bholu and Another 2022 SCC Online SC 870)

- 2. The opportunity to cross examine the psychologist or other expert has to be given to CCL. (Bholu vs. CBI Criminal Revision No. 2366 of 2018)
- 3. No doubt JJB should seek the opinion of an expert regarding physical and mental capacity of a CCL to commit an offence but it is not necessary that if the opinion of

the expert is positive then the JJB is bound by the expert opinion. It is well within the jurisdiction of the JJB to agree or disagree with the P.A. report of the CCL submitted by the psychologist to the Board. (**Pradeep Kumar vs. State of NCT Delhi & etc. 2019 (260) DLT 641)**

- The word 'may' in proviso to section 15 (1) of the Act would have to be read as 'shall'. The assistance of experienced psychologist or psycho social workers or other experts while conducting preliminary assessment is thus mandatory. (Ojef Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, CRR No. 2071 of 2021 decided on 21.09.2021)
- 5. The word 'may' used in section 19 does not give option to the Children's Court to decide or not to decide but the expression 'may decide' is an option to the Children'sCourt to choose between option (i) and option (ii) that :

"Whether CCL is to be tried as child or as an adult."(LK @ LKP vs. State (Delhi High Court) 2019 (262) DLT 319)

- 6. Where the appeal under section 101(2) of the Act against the order of preliminary assessment has been filed. The Children's Court shall first decide the appeal. If it comes to the conclusion that there is no need for trial of the child as an adult, it shall dispose of the matter itself according to section 19 of the Act and Rules (R.13(3&4)).
- 7. Even on receipt of the case by way of transfer from the Board, if the Children's Court comes to the conclusion that the CCL has to be treated as a child, it cannot send the case back to the Board but has to decide it itself acting as Board but without any member.
- 8. After holding the CCL to be guilty, dispositional order must be accompanied by the Individual Care Plan. On conclusion of trial by the Children's Court, it has not to pass the order to send the CCL to the jail on attaining the age of 21 years but has to assess at the age of 21 years of the CCL whether he has reformed and is fit to be restored in the society and if not then has to be sent to the jail.(Ravinder vs. State of Haryana CRA-D-193-2023 (O&M) decided on 23.03.2023)

Dr. Sonia Kinra Additional District & Sessions Judge -cum-Faculty Member, Chandigarh Judicial Academy

LATEST CASES: CIVIL

"A contract (or a term in a contract) can be said to be unfair or unreasonable if it is one-sided or devoid of any commercial logic. In the present case, although theatre owners may unilaterally determine the conditions of entry into cinema hall, the condition imposed in this instance is not unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable."

— Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J. in K.C. Cinema v. State of J&K, (2023) 5 SCC 786, para 30

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908

Yadaiah and Anr. vs State of Telangana and others: Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 664-HELD-While dismissing the appeal against the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Telangana, it was reiterate by Hon'ble Supreme Court that only fundamental determinations of the Court are hit by res judicata in subsequent proceedings. It was further held that if the Court makes any incidental, supplemental or nonessential observations which are not foundational to the final determination, the same would not tie down the hands of courts in future.

Y.P. Lele v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. & Ors.: Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 732-HELD-Dismissing the appeal passed against the order passed by Hon'ble Bombay High Court, it was held by Hon'ble Apex Court that "explanation" in Order XVII Rule 2 CPC applies when a party that has led substantial evidence fails to appear; it doesn't apply to parties who haven't presented evidence.

Smt. Ved Kumari (Dead Thr Her Legal Representative Dr. Vijay Agarwal) v Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Thr Its Commissioner) :Neutral Citation: 2023 **INSC 764-HELD-I**t was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that It was the duty of the Executing Court to issue warrant of possession for effecting physical delivery of the suit land to the decree-holder in terms of suit schedule property and if any resistance is offered by any stranger to the decree, the same be adjudicated upon in accordance with Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI of the CPC. The Executing Court could not have dismissed the execution petition by treating the decree to be inexecutable merely on the basis that the decree-holder lost possession to third has а party/encroacher. If this is allowed to happen, every judgment-debtor who is in possession of the immoveable property till the decree is passed, shall hand over possession to a third party to defeat the decree-holder's right and entitlement to enjoy the fruits of litigation and this may continue indefinitely and no decree for immovable property can be executed.

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956

M Sivadasan (Dead) through LRs v. A.Soudamini (Dead) through LRs and others : Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 774-HELD- The case was a civil appeal stemming from a suit filed in Kerala. Concurrently, the Courts ruled against the plaintiffs, stating that the woman from whom they claim to derive their rights was never in possession of the property, and so Section 14(1) did not apply. It was also reiterated by Hon'be Supreme Court that for a Hindu female to claim rights under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, she has to be in possession of the property.

LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894

BESCO Limited v. State of Haryana & Others: Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 759-HELD-While setting aside the judgments passed by Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court, it was observed by Hon'be Supreme Court while dealing with the batch of appeals that since the subject lands are acquired under one notification and the plan brought on record evidences the location and proximity to development in and around the acquired land. The belting of area for valuation would be incorrect. Hence, the Court deemed it just to determine uniform market value to the lands under acquisition.

LIMITATION ACT, 1963

Government of Kerala & Anr. v. Joseph and Others: Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 693-HELD- While allowing appeal against the judgment passed by Honble Kerala High Court, it was held by Hon'ble Supeme Court that merely a long period of possession, does not translate into the right of adverse possession.

SERVICE JURISPRUDENCE

State Bank of India v. A.G.D. Reddy:Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 766-HELD- On an appeal against the judgment passed by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is well settled that, in a disciplinary proceeding, the question of burden of proof would depend upon the nature of the charge and the nature of the explanation put forward by the respondent. In a given case, the burden may be shifted to the respondent depending upon the explanation.

It was also reiterated that the purpose of judicial review is not to re-evaluate the merits of a decision but rather focuses on ensuring the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process and verifying the presence of evidence to support the findings. Hence, Hon'ble Apex Court allowed the said appeal.

SPECIAL RELIEF ACT, 1963 Ramathal & Ors. v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRS & Anr. :Neutral Citation: **2023 INSC 737**-**HELD**- In this case, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Power of Attorney, having been found to be invalid, any further action taken pursuant to it, cannot be held as valid.

Smt. Shiramabai W/O Pundalik Bhave & Others v The Captain, Record Officer For O.I.C. Records, Sena Corps Abhilekh, Gaya, Bihar State And Another:Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 744-HELD-Allowing the appeal of a wife, whose husband (who was in the army) had married her while still being legally married to another woman but had divorced that woman and the husband had named the wife as his legal heir, Honble Supreme Court reiterated that there is a legal presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and woman have lived together for a significant period of time and that anyone seeking to challenge the validity of such a relationship bears a heavy burden of proof to rebut this presumption.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 Prakash (Dead) By LR. v. G. Aradhya & Ors.:Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 743-HELD-On the core issue whether the transaction between the parties was an absolute sale of the property or it was a mortgage, Hon'ble Supreme Court examined section 58 (c) Transfer of Property Act to differentiate between mortgage by conditional sale and sale with a condition of repurchase. The Apex Court emphasized that the condition must be embodied in the document that effects or purports to affect the sale. Hence, it was held that transaction in question constituted an absolute sale followed by an option to repurchase, rather than a mortgage.

Harshali Chowdhary

Additional District & Sessions Judge -cum-Faculty Member, CJA

LATEST CASES: CRIMINAL

"As Section 84 IPC has its laudable objective behind it, the prosecution and the court have their distinct roles to play. The agency has to take up the investigation from the materials produced on behalf of the person claiming unsoundness. It has to satisfy itself that the case would not come within the purview of Section 84 IPC. The court on its part has to satisfy itself as to whether the act was done by a person with an unsound mind within the rigour of Section 84 IPC."

- M.M. Sundresh, J. in Prakash Nayi v. State of Goa, (2023) 5 SCC 673, paras 10 and 11

Harendra Rai Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1023: 2023 INSC 738: Authority of a Court to accept certain facts

under Section 56 of the Evidence Act?

FIR a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act?

Treatment of the FIR/Bayan Tahriri as dying declaration?

Appreciation of ocular evidence?-HELD-Hearing a Criminal Appeal against the judgment and order dismissing the Revision Petition confirming the judgment acquitting accused of all the charges under Sections 147, 148, 149/307 and 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarised the law, in respect of taking judicial notice of any fact, in the following manner:

(i). The doctrine of judicial notice, as provided under Section 56, is an exception to general rules of evidence applicable for proving any fact by adducing evidence in the Court of law. (ii). According to Section 56 of the Evidence Act, judicial notice of any such fact can be taken by the Court, which is well-known to everyone, which is in the common knowledge of everyone, which is authoritatively attested, which is so apparent on the face of the record, etc.

(iii). Except in the rarest of rare cases, judicial notice of any fact is generally not taken in criminal matters in the normal course of proceeding, and the case is decided on the basis of oral, material and documentary evidence adduced by the parties to find out the guilt or innocence.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that it is an undisputed position of law that the FIR is a public document defined under Section 74 of the Evidence Act.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further clarified the position of law that the statement by an injured person recorded as FIR can be treated as a dying declaration and such a statement is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was also held that the dying declaration must not cover the whole incident or narrate the case history. Corroboration is not necessary for this situation; a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that there is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.

II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

III. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But Courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the timesense of individuals which varies from person to person.

XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.

Manoj Kumar Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Kallu @ Habib Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 : 2023 INSC 705

Evidentiary value of disclosure statements under Section 27, Evidence Act?-HELD-Hearing Criminal Appeals against the common judgment and order upholding conviction for the offence punishable under Section 411 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that the decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya and others vs. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 holds the field even today wherein it was held that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered fact, including details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the accused person's awareness of these aspects.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that the law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements of co-accused too is settled; the courts have hesitated to place reliance solely on disclosure statements of co-accused and used them merely to support the conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed in *Emperor vs. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty* (1911) *ILR* 38 *Cal* 559, to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused".

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that in Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, the Constitution Bench elaborated the approach to be adopted by courts when dealing with disclosure statements as to that in dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is riaht.

Sathyan Vs. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986: 2023 INSC 703 -Whether the conviction, solely on the basis of official witnesses is sustainable? -HELD-Hearing a Criminal Appeal against the order and judgement upholding conviction under Section 8 of the Abkari Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that it can no longer be said to be res integra that the person receiving the information of the crime or detecting the occurrence thereof, can investigate the same. Questioning such investigation on the basis of bias or such like factor, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not amenable to a general unqualified rule that lends itself to uniform application.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that simply because the person who detected the commission of the offence, is the one who filed the report or investigated, such an investigation cannot be said to be bad in law. That particular submission therefore must necessarily be negatived.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that if the evidence of a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy then basing the conviction thereupon, cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that the testimonies of official witnesses cannot be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. Sreenivasa Reddy Vs. Rakesh Sharma & Anr.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 952: 2023 INSC 682 -Whether Section 197 of the CrPC is applicable in the case of an employee of a Nationalised Bank?

Difference between the statutorv requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 and Section 197 of the CrPC?-HELD-Hearing a Criminal Appeal against the judgment and order rejecting the petition and thereby declining to quash the criminal proceedings instituted for the offence punishable under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 468 and 471 respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that although a person working in a Nationalised Bank is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC would not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that the banking sector being governed by the Reserve Bank of India and considered as a limb of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution and also by virtue of Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the employee is deemed to be a "public servant" for the purpose of provisions under the PC Act, 1988. However, the same cannot be extended to the IPC.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that Sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC concerns a public servant who "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" whereas, the offences contemplated in the PC Act, 1988 are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that there can be no thumb rule that in a prosecution before the court of Special Judge, the previous sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only prerequisite. If the offences on the charge of which, the public servant is expected to be put on trial include the offences other than those punishable under the PC Act, 1988 that is to say under the general law (i.e. IPC), the court is bound to examine, at the time of cognizance and also, if necessary, at subsequent stages (as the case progresses) as to whether there is a necessity of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that there is a material difference between the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 on one hand, and Section 197 of the CrPC, on the other. In the prosecution for the offences exclusively under the PC Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory qua the public servant. In cases under the general penal law against the public servant, the necessity (or otherwise) of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC depends on the factual aspects.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that the test in the latter case is of the "nexus" between the act of commission or omission and the official duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. It is too simplistic an approach to adopt and to reject the necessity of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC on such reasoning.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further noted that the "safe and sure test", is to ascertain if the omission or neglect to commit the act complained of would have made the public servant answerable for the charge of dereliction of his official duty. He may have acted "in excess of his duty", but if there is a "reasonable connection" between the impugned act and the performance of the official duty, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC cannot be denied, so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a cloak for illicit acts.

V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The State represented by Deputy Director and Ors.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 934: 2023 INSC 677-Compliance of Section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973 read with Section 19 of the PMLA 2002?-HELD-Hearing a Criminal Appeal challenging the interim order of the High Court and the conditions imposed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge while granting remand and for the exclusion of 15 days under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up the law as under:-

i. When an arrestee is forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 19(3) of the PMLA, 2002 no writ of Habeus Corpus would lie. Any plea of illegal arrest is to be made before such Magistrate since custody becomes judicial.

ii. Any non-compliance of the mandate of Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002 would enure to the benefit of the person arrested. For such noncompliance, the Competent Court shall have the power to initiate action under Section 62 of the PMLA, 2002.

iii. An order of remand has to be challenged only before a higher forum as provided under the CrPC, 1973 when it depicts a due application of mind both on merit and compliance of Section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973 read with Section 19 of the PMLA 2002.

iv. Section 41A of the CrPC, 1973 has got no application to an arrest made under the PMLA 2002.

v. The maximum period of 15 days of police custody is meant to be applied to the entire period of investigation - 60 or 90 days, as a whole.

vi. The words "such custody" occurring in Section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973 would include not only a police custody but also that of other investigating agencies.

vii. The word "custody" under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973 shall mean actual custody.

viii. Curtailment of 15 days of police custody by any extraneous circumstances, act of God, an order of Court not being the handy work of investigating agency would not act as a restriction.

ix. Section 167 of the CrPC, 1973 is a bridge between liberty and investigation performing a fine balancing act.

x. The decision of this Court in *CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141,* as followed subsequently requires reconsideration by a reference to a larger Bench.

Md. Asfak Alam Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 892-Directions regarding arrest and detention?-HELD-Hearing a Criminal Appeal aggrieved by the denial of anticipatory bail and a further direction to surrender before the Court and seek regular bail under Section 498A, 323/504/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed all the courts ceased of proceedings to strictly follow the law laid down in *Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, [2014] 8 SCR 128* and reiterate the directions contained thereunder, as well as other directions:

"I. 11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention casually and mechanically. In order to, ensure what we have observed above, we give the following directions:

11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC;

11.2. All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

11.3. The police officer- shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

11.4. The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental

action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

11.8. Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the case under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a terms which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine."

II. The High Court shall frame the above directions in the form of notifications and guidelines to be followed by the Sessions courts and all other and criminal courts dealing with various offences.

III. Likewise, the Director General of Police in all States shall ensure that strict instructions in terms of above directions are issued. Both the High Courts and the DGP's of all States shall ensure that such guidelines and Directives/Departmental Circulars are issued for guidance of all lower courts and police authorities in each State within eight weeks from today.

IV. Affidavits of compliance shall be filed before this court within ten weeks by all the states and High Courts, though their Registrars.

Amrinder Singh Shergill

Additional District & Sessions Judge -cum-Faculty Member, CJA

LATEST CASES: PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT

"The importance of making judgments accessible to persons from all sections of society, especially persons with disability needs emphasis. All judicial institutions must ensure that the judgments and orders being published by them do not carry improperly placed watermarks as they end up making the documents inaccessible for persons with visual disability who use screen readers to access them. On the same note, courts and tribunals must also ensure that the version of the judgments and orders uploaded is accessible and signed using digital signatures. They should not be scanned versions of printed copies. The practice of printing and scanning documents is a futile and time-consuming process which does not serve any purpose. The practice should be eradicated from the litigation process as it tends to make documents as well as the process inaccessible for an entire gamut of citizens."

- Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J. in SBI v. Ajay Kumar Sood, (2023) 7 SCC 282, para 22

Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi): 2023 SCC OnLine SC 280-Whether there is any direct evidence of demand, if not then there is any circumstantial whether evidence to prove the demand?-HELD- The Court took note of Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act and the aforesaid decision of the Constitution bench, and said that even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7. Further, it said that the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are proved. Once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary is proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Placing reliance on N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., (2021) 3 SCC 687, the Court said that the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, it concluded that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court said that there are no circumstances brought on record which will prove the demand for gratification.

Therefore, it was held that the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act were not established and consequently, the offence.

Neeraj Datta v. State : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1724: In absence of complainant's direct evidence of bribe, presumption of Public Servant's guilt can be drawn based on other evidence -HELD- that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inference of culpability/quilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant if the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence.

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) The presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.

Vijay Rajmohan v. State: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1377: Whether an order of the Appointing Authority granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, would be rendered illegal on the ground of acting as per dictation if it consults the Central Vigilance Commission for its decision?-HELD-The Central Vigilance Commission, constituted under the CVC Act is specifically entrusted with the duty and function of providing expert advice on the subject. It may be necessary for the appointing authority to call for and seek the opinion of the CVC before it takes any decision on the request for sanction for prosecution. The statutory scheme under which the appointing authority could call for, seek, and consider the advice of the CVC can neither be termed as acting under dictation nor a factor which could be referred to as an irrelevant consideration. The opinion of the CVC is only advisory. It is nevertheless a valuable input in the decisionmaking process of the appointing authority. The final decision of the appointing authority must be of its own by application of independent mind. The issue is, therefore, answered by holding that there is no illegality in the action of the appointing authority, the DoPT, if it calls for, refers, and considers the opinion of the Central Vigilance Commission before it takes its final decision on the request for sanction for prosecuting a public servant. Whether the period of three months for the Appointing Authority to decide upon a request for sanction is mandatory or not? Whether the criminal proceedings can be guashed if the decision is not taken within the mandatory period?-HELD- Statutory provisions requiring sanction before prosecution either under Section 197 CrPC or under Section 97 of the PC Act intend to serve the purpose of protecting a public servant. These protections are not available to other citizens because of the inherent vulnerabilities of a public servant and the need to protect them. However, the said protection is neither a shield against dereliction of duty nor an absolute immunity against corrupt practices. The limited immunity or bar is only subject to a sanction by the appointing authority. Grant of sanction being an exercise of executive power, it is subject to the standard principles of judicial review such as application of independent mind; only by the competent authority, without bias, after consideration of relevant material and by eschewing irrelevant considerations. As the power to grant sanction for prosecution has legal consequences, it must naturally be exercised within a reasonable period. The new proviso to Section 19 of PC Act mandating that the competent authority shall endeavour to convey the decision on the proposal for sanction within a period of three months can only be read and understood as a compelling statutory obligation. Refusing to accept State's submission that this proviso is only directory in nature, the Court observed, "the consistent effort made by all branches of the State, the Judiciary, the Legislative, and the Executive, to ensure early decision-making by the competent authority cannot be watered down by lexical interpretation of the expression endeavour in the proviso. The sanctioning authority must bear in mind that public confidence in the maintenance of the Rule of Law. which is fundamental in the administration of justice, is at stake here." The Court stressed that by causing delay in considering the request for sanction, the sanctioning authority stultifies judicial scrutiny, thereby vitiating the process of determination of the allegations against the corrupt official. Delays in prosecuting the corrupt breeds a culture of impunity and leads to systemic resignation to the existence of corruption in

public life. Such inaction is fraught with the risk making future generations of aettina accustomed to corruption as a way of life. Viewed in this context, the duty to take an early decision inheres in the power vested in the appointing authority to grant or not to grant sanction. The intention of the Parliament is evident from a combined reading of the first proviso to Section 19, which uses the expression 'endeavour' with the subsequent provisions. The third proviso mandates that the extended period can be granted only for one month after reasons are recorded in writing. There is no further extension. The fourth proviso, which empowers the Central Government to prescribe necessary guidelines for ensuring the mandate, may also be noted in this regard. It can thus be concluded that the Parliament intended that the process of grant of sanction must be completed within four months, which includes the extended period of one month. The Court, however, made clear that the non-compliance with a mandatory period cannot and should not automatically lead to the guashing of criminal proceedings because the prosecution of a public servant for corruption has an element of public interest having a direct bearing on the rule of law. It must also be kept in mind that the complainant or victim has no other remedy available for judicial redressal if the criminal proceedings stand automatically guashed. At the same time, a decision to grant deemed sanction may cause prejudice to the rights of the accused as there would also be nonapplication of mind in such cases. Maintaining the delicate balance between the competing interests of the parties involved, the While arriving at this balance, the Court must keep in mind the duty cast on the competent authority to grant sanction within the stipulated period of time. There must be a consequence of dereliction of duty to giving sanction within the time specified. The way forward is to make the appointing authority accountable for the delay in the grant of sanction. "Accountability in itself is an essential principle of administrative law. Judicial review of administrative action will be meaningful effective and by ensuring accountability of the officer or authority in charge." Hence, upon expiry of the three months and the additional one-month period, the aggrieved party, be it the complainant, accused or victim, would be entitled to

approach the concerned writ court. They are entitled to seek appropriate remedies, including directions for action on the request for sanction and for the corrective measure on accountability that the sanctioning authority bears. This is especially crucial if the nongrant of sanction is withheld without reason, resulting in the stifling of a genuine case of corruption. Simultaneously, the CVC shall enquire into the matter in the exercise of its powers under Section 8(1)(e) and (f) and take such corrective action as it is empowered under the CVC Act.

> Mahima Tuli Research Fellow

NOTIFICATION

1. Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023 prohibits unauthorized recording

of Films: On 4-8-2023, the Ministry of Law and Justice notified the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023 to amend the Cinematograph Act, 1952.

Key Points:

- The definition of "UA Marker" has been inserted which is an age-based indicator for a film which has received or is intended to receive a "UA" certificate under section 4 and such indicator may be "UA 7+" or "UA 13+" or "UA 16+".
- Section 6 AA has been inserted relating to the Prohibition of unauthorized recording restricting anyone and everyone from using any audio- visual recording device in a place which is licensed to exhibit films to avoid infringement.
- 3. Section 6 AB has been inserted prohibiting the use of or abet the use of infringing copy of any film to exhibit to public for profit.
- 4. In case of contravention, that person will be punished with imprisonment for at least 3 months but not more than 3 years. The person will be liable to pay a fine which is not less than 3 lakhs and can extend upto 5%.

Note: Here, "audio-visual recording device" means a digital or analogue photographic or video camera, or any other technology or device capable of enabling the recording or transmission of a copyrighted cinematographic film or any part thereof, regardless of whether audio-visual recording is the sole or primary purpose of the device.¹

¹https://mib.gov.in/sites/default/files/Gazette%20of%20India%20for%20The%20Cinematograph%20% 28Amendment%29%20Bill%202023.pdf

EVENTS OF THE MONTH

The Juvenile Justice Committee and the Supreme Court of India had requested the Chandigarh Judicial Academy to organize a State Level Consultation on Children in Conflict with law, 2023 for Members of High Court Committee, Principle Secretary and Director of Department of Women and Child Development/Social Welfare/Nodal Department for Child Protection, JJ Act Implementation, Chairperson/Members of SCPCRs, selected JJB Members including Social Workers and Member Secretary of SLSA, Directors of State Police Academy and other entities from the Police etc. The said consultation was held at Chandigarh Judicial Academy on August 12, 2023. The key areas for the consultation were Prevention of Child Offending; Diversion, Alternatives to Detention and non-Custodial Alternatives; Rehabilitation and Restorative Practices; Right to Fair Trial and Child Friendly Procedures, Including Legal and other appropriate Assistance and Minimum age of criminal responsibility and age of criminal majority (pre-assessment). The overview of the consultation was given by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Lisa Gill, Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court-Chairman, Juvenile Justice Monitoring Committee, High Court. The resource persons and the panelists for the consultation were Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Alka Sarin, Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod S.Bhardwaj, Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat, Judge, Punjab & Harvana High Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kuldeep Tiwari, Judge, Punjab & Harvana High Court, Sh.Parmod Goyal, District & Sessions Judge, Dr.K.P.Singh, former DGP, Haryana, Sh.Baljinder Singh Sra, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dr. Anshu Singla, DCP, Sonepat, Sh.Gautam Singhal, AIG, Training Punjab Police, Dr. Arzoo Gupta, Asstt Professor, Clinical Psychology, GMCH-32 and Dr. Satinder Kaur Sachdeva, Chairperson, Child Welfare Committee, Chandigarh and Dr.Sonia Kinra, ADJ-cum-Faculty Member, CJA (Coordinator). The expression of gratitude for the consultation was delivered by Sh.Ajay Kumar Sharda, District & Sessions Judgecum-Director (Administration), CJA.

- Chandigarh Judicial Academy had organized a Webinar for CJMs and ACJMs from the States of Punjab, Haryana and UT Chandigarh on "Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002" held on August 16, 2023. The resource persons for the said webinar was Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K.Jain, Former, Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court.
- The Chandigarh Judicial Academy organized a Refresher-cum-orientation course on August 26, 2023 for the Civil Judges from the States of Punjab, Haryana and U.T. Chandigarh. The topics for the said course were Seizure and Sampling under NDPS Act by Sh.Pradeep Mehta, Faculty Member, CJA; Appreciation of Evidence by Sh.Arunvir Vashista, District & Sessions Judge, Chandigarh; Various Contours of Cyber Crime by Ms.Harshali Chowdhary, ADJ-Cum-Faculty Member, CJA and Injunctions: Issues and Challenges by Sh. Amrinder Singh Shergill, ADJ-Cum-Faculty Member, CJA. Ms.Madhu Khanna Lalli, ADJ-Cum-Faculty Member was the Course Coordinator for the said course.

PICTORIAL GLIMPSES





Refresher-cum-Orientation Course for Civil Judges from the States of Punjab, Haryana and UT Chandigarh.

